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mitad del 81 al verano del 79. Este texto revisa la cuestión e intenta una 
resolución estableciendo una revaluación de las fuentes. Como resultado, 
esta investigación arroja una nueva luz sobre la abdicación de Sila. Sus ra-
zones y, por último, pero no menos importante, las ramificaciones desde el 
último Triunvirato a la temprana época de Augusto. Al final de este studio 
un breve epílogo revisa el tiempo y las circunstancias de la ejecución de 
Q. Lucrecio Ofela y considera la cuestión de los motivos profesados por 
Sila.
Palabras clave: Sila; República romana; abdicación; Triumvirato r.p.c.; 
Q. Lucretius Ofella.
ABSTRACT: Sulla’s paradoxical dictatura legibus scribundis et rei pub-
licae constituendae has ever remained the subject of controversy, amongst 
both the ancients (on which see now comprehensively Eckert 2016) and 
modern Roman historians. One major issue that continues to divide schol-
arship is that of the tempus legitimum of his dictatorship and, in particular, 
the approximate time of his abdication, with proposed dates ranging from 
as early as mid-81 to the summer of 79. This chapter revisits this question 
and attempts a resolution of the matter by virtue of a careful reappraisal of 
the extant source material. As a result, this inquiry also casts a new light on the 
modalities of Sulla’s abdication, his rationale, and, last but not least, the 
ramifications for our understanding of the transition from the late triumviral 
to early Augustan era. Against the background of this study, a brief post-
script revisits the timing and circumstances of the notorious execution of 
Q. Lucretius Ofella and considers the issue of Sulla’s professed and ulterior 
motives.
Keywords: Sulla; Roman Republic; Abdication; Triumvirate r.p.c.; 
Q. Lucretius Ofella.
1. INTRODUCTION: SULLA’S OFFICIAL CAUSA AND TEMPUS UNDER THE VALERIAN LAW
Seemingly trivial, the issue of the date and modalities of Sulla’s abdi-
cation of the dictatorship has significant ramifications for our understand-
ing of late republican political history and the turbulent transition from 
Republic to Empire. First, Sulla’s arguably unique dictatorship is widely, 
and justly, perceived as a watershed in the final century of the so-called 
Res Publica libera. After its violent collapse in the eighties BCE and Sulla’s 
unorthodox remedies, nothing would ever be the same, if only since he 
had taken a great many unprecedented actions before and during his ten-
ure as dictator, and many of his measures would survive his death in 78 
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BCE1. Second, the question whether or not Sulla’s time in office exceeded 
the dictatorship’s traditional comminatory maximum term of six months 
unavoidably affects ancient and modern appraisals and representations of 
Sulla’s temporary monarchy. Last but not least, Sulla’s political methods 
also matter in that they set a number of precedents for the actions of en-
suing late republican dynasts. In the epilogue to this study, it will indeed 
be argued that Sulla’s sophisticated «dictatorial exit strategy» provided yet 
another precedent that was not lost on Caesar’s adoptive son and political 
heir, Imperator Caesar Divi filius. An inquiry into the particulars of when 
and how Sulla abandoned his epochal dictatorship is, therefore, tanta-
mount to a study into Sullan statecraft2.
The question of the tempus legitimum of Sulla’s unprecedented dic-
tatura legibus scribundis et rei publicae constituendae as defined by the 
interregal lex Valeria of 82 BCE remains a matter of scholarly debate3. 
There is no indication whatsoever in the extant sources that the Valerian 
Law stipulated a precise comminatory tempus, on the model of the tra-
ditional dictatura rei gerundae caussa, a mandate that typically required 
the dictator to abdicate within the maximum term of six months, even if 
his specific task as decreed by the Senate had not been completed4. That 
1.  Already in antiquity, Sulla’s career and feats of the 80s BCE had made a lasting 
impression: see now the excellent treatment in ECKERT, 2016. For Sulla’s victory in Rome’s 
first full-fledged civil war as a decisive turning point in Roman republican history, see 
FLOWER, 2010, 80-96 («Violence and the Breakdown of the Political Process (133-81)» and, 
esp., 117-134 («Sulla’s New Republic»).
2. Both SYME, 2016a, 56f. and especially BADIAN, 1970, 3 rightly consider the end of 
Sulla’s dictatorship as an issue of the greatest importance. I also share Badian’s belief (loc. 
cit.) in «the importance of reaching the greatest possible precision in our data». Comp. 
SYME, loc. cit.: «the chronology demands careful investigation».
3. For a more comprehensive discussion of the circumstances and scope of the lex 
Valeria, see my aforementioned article in CCG 2004. Though the Fasti Consulares and 
Triumphales merely list Sulla as dictator under 82 (Degrassi Inscr. Ital. 13.1, 54f.: Fasti 
Consulares, with L. Valerius Flaccus as interrex) and 81 (Degrassi Inscr. Ital. 13.1, 84f.: 
Fasti Triumphales), there should be no doubt that his official causa was legibus scribundis 
et rei publicae constituendae: HURLET, 1993, 95 & VERVAET, 2004, 38-58. HINARD, 2008, 49-54 
argues that Sulla was merely appointed dictator rei publicae constituendae under the terms 
of the Valerian law. A full reappraisal of Sulla’s precise titulature is beyond the scope of 
this inquiry. Nonetheless, the fact that, unlike the triumuiri r.p.c., Sulla passed an impres-
sive raft of legislation meant to stand the test of time further supports the contention that 
he was dictator legibus scribundis et rei publicae constituendae.
4. In his brilliant study on the tempora of Roman magistracies (1953), Ugo Coli de-
monstrates that, although the basic principles of the Republican polity required all Roman 
magistracies be ad tempus, some were ad tempus certum, with a well-defined duration, 
whilst others ad tempus incertum, without a fixed term. Given the continuous indispen-
sability of their functions, the consulship and all other permanently recurring magistracies 
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Sulla’s dictatorship was very different from the dictatorship of old, and 
that he alone could decide on the duration of his tenure is, however, re-
corded emphatically in App. B.C. 1.99, where we are told the following 
about the circumstances of Sulla’s appointment:
The Romans did not like it, but they had no more opportunities 
for elections according to law, and they considered that this matter was 
not altogether in their own power. So, in the general deadlock, they 
welcomed this pretence of an election as an image and semblance of 
freedom, and chose Sulla their absolute master for as long as he pleased. 
There had been autocratic rule of dictators before, but it was limited to 
short periods. However, under Sulla, it first became unlimited and so an 
absolute tyranny. All the same they added, for propriety’s sake, that they 
chose him dictator for the enactment of such laws as he himself might 
deem best and for the (re)constitution of the Republic5.
were limited to one year. Those magistracies, however, that carried exceptional or unusual 
responsibilities had inherent temporal limitations, since their raison d’être ceased to exist 
from the moment their designated task was fulfilled. The best known examples of the lat-
ter category are the dictatorship, its different causae defining its specific functions, and the 
censura. Although the dictatura rei gerundae caussa and the censorship were indeed limi-
ted to six and eighteen months respectively, these tempora were meant as the maximum 
time span for the completion of the set task. In correlation with this sharp distinction, Coli 
goes on to explain, there also existed a fundamental difference as regards the cessatio of 
both categories of magistracies. Once their term expired, the magistratus annui lapsed au-
tomatically, ipso iure. If they had not been granted the right to further exercise the potestas 
of the magistracy concerned by virtue of explicit prorogation, their occupants irreversibly 
became private citizens. This form of cessatio was termed magistratu abire and was an 
involuntary act. The magistracies ad tempus incertum, however, could not cease ipso iure, 
since their occupants had to abdicate, i.e., to perform the act of uoluntate abire magi-
stratu. On the one hand, it was indeed expected that the magistrate concerned should lay 
down his office as soon as the task to which he had been appointed was completed. From 
this very moment, there no longer was any rationale for the magistracy and staying in of-
fice was considered a censurable abuse. On the other hand, these magistrates nonetheless 
continued to hold office until formal and explicit abdication. On a dictator’s abdication 
duty, see also KUNKEL & WITTMANN, 1995, 670-672.
5. Appian’s summary creates the impression that Sulla was appointed to the dicta- 
torship directly by the lex Valeria itself, whereas this statute really commissioned the 
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In all likelihood, the Valerian Law would not have expressly sup-
pressed the expectation for Sulla to abdicate. Rather, it would have 
stipulated that he would have to do so only after taking all measures 
— legislative and otherwise — he saw fit to restore the Republic following 
its violent collapse in the period preceding his appointment. Two consid-
erations, however, meant that, de facto if not de iure, Sulla could retain his 
special dictatorship as long as he, and only he, saw fit. First, there was the 
sheer scale of his official mandate, a task with which a single magistrate 
had never before been commissioned. Second, the Valerian Law had in-
vested him with a wide range of extraordinary powers and prerogatives. 
Most formidable were his discretionary power over any Roman citizen’s 
life, domi militiaeque, since he was dictator sine prouocatione, and the 
fact that all his dictatorial acta had the force of statute law. As if that were 
not enough, he was also invested with the supreme command, the sum-
mum imperium auspiciumque, across the entire Roman world6. Under 
such circumstances, Sulla was indeed entirely at liberty to continue his 
dictatorship as long as he remained convinced of its necessity7. It should, 
therefore, not surprise that Appian in B.C. 1.3 also produces the follow-
ing appraisal of Sulla’s dictatorship as well as his defiant attitude in laying 
it down — the emphasis on the unprecedented length of Sulla’s absolute 
dictatorship being of particular interest to this inquiry:
No unseemly deed was left undone until, about fifty years after 
the death of Gracchus, Cornelius Sulla, one of these faction leaders, 
doctoring one evil with another, made himself sole master of the state for 
a very long time [my italics]. Such officials were formerly called dictators 
— an office created in the most perilous circumstances for six months 
only, and long since fallen into disuse. But Sulla, although nominally 
interrex L. Valerius Flaccus (cos. 100) to nominate Sulla as dictator and then himself as 
magister equitum: Vervaet 2004, 40f.
6. See VERVAET, 2004, 38-58; comp. also VERVAET, 2014a, 215. 
7. See in this sense already EHRENBERG, 1953, 126: «Nobody but the dictator himself 
could decide when in his view the state was ‘set up’ again». Comp. also ECKERT, 2016, 191: 
«Sullas Diktatur war ein Novum, weil sie an keine zeitliche Begrenzung gebunden war».
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elected, became dictator for life by force and compulsion. Nevertheless 
he became satiated with power and was the first man, so far as I know, 
holding supreme power, who had the courage to lay it down voluntarily 
and to declare that he would render an account of his stewardship to 
any who were dissatisfied with it8.
He then goes on to relate that, after his voluntary abdication, Sulla 
was able to pursue his life unmolested as a private citizen. Similarly, in 
B.C. 1.4 Appian notes that Iulius Caesar, having overpowered his oppo-
nents by war, «was chosen next after Sulla dictator for life»: 
. Whilst de iure, the tempora legitima 
of Caesar’s successive dictatorships differed substantially from Sulla’s legal 
term of office, his appointment to the dictatura perpetua at the beginning 
of 44 signifies that, de facto, the tenure of his last, lifelong dictatorship 
was not altogether unlike Sulla’s term of office. In terms of public law, 
however, there was a fundamental difference between Sulla’s dictator-
ship legibus scribundis et rei publicae constituendae, the causa inherently 
implying the obligation and intent to abdicate legibus datis et re publica 
constituta, and Caesar’s dictatura perpetua, officially meant to last until 
his death (or unforeseen voluntary abdication). That Sulla probably justi-
fied his abdication by referring to the mandate and finality of the Valerian 
Law may well be reflected in Aur. Vict. Vir. Ill. 75.12: re publica ordina-
ta dictaturam deposuit — probably a compressed allusion to Sulla’s final 
speech proclaiming the full accomplishment of the dictatorial causa at-
tested in App. B.C. 1.104 (infra)9. Considering that Sulla could easily have 
had himself appointed dictator perpetuo (or something similar) following 
his victory in the civil war10 and what we know about his official mandate, 
Wilcken’s conclusion that it was always his intention to abdicate on some 
8. In B.C. 1.103, Appian again amply expresses his utter amazement at Sulla’s decision 
to abdicate his position of supreme power: «This act seems wonderful to me — that Sulla 
should have been the first, and till then the only one, to abdicate such vast power without 
compulsion, not to sons (like Ptolemaeus in Egypt, or Ariobarzanes in Cappadocia, or 
Seleucus in Syria), but to the very people over whom he had tyrannized». 
9. This evidence corroborates De Martino’s argument (in 1958, 73f.) that Sulla became 
dictator until he thought fit to abdicate, but that it was indeed the intention of the lex 
Valeria that he should abdicate after the restoration of the Res Publica. For the term 
republica reciperata being used from the era of Sulla to describe his victory, see e.g. Cic. 
Rosc. Am. 141; Dom. 79; Brut. 311 & Sall. Cat. 11.
10. As dictator legibus scribundis, he was also legally empowered to decree a lifelong 
extension of his tenure.
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unspecified day, and that he recognized «die mit der Diktatur verbundene 
Abdankungspflicht», should not be called into question11. 
On the one hand, Sulla was under no comminatory obligation to ab-
dicate within a period of six months, unlike the traditional dictators rei 
gerendae caussa, regardless of the fact that Senate and/or People could 
always authorize temporary continuation past this customary comminato-
ry term. On the other hand, the arrangement concerning his term of office 
was not a complete breach of custom. In 1953, U. Coli cogently argued 
that, regardless of the maximum term of six months, dictators were always 
expected to abdicate, and generally did so, upon fulfillment of the specific 
task (causa) for which they had been appointed12. The term of Sulla’s 
dictatorship was at least theoretically in accordance with customary law to 
the extent that it was the intent of the Valerian Law that Sulla should abdi-
cate following completion of his task, regardless of its magnitude and the 
time required. Faced with unusual circumstances and a Republic in ruins 
and armed with a formidable battery of iura extraordinaria, Sulla clearly 
felt it made little sense to subject his novel dictatorship to an expressly 
defined comminatory tempus legitimum13.
11. WILCKEN, 1940, 7; cf. also HURLET, 1993, 165-168. Contra EHRENBERG, 1953, 125, 
where it is argued that «it seems unlikely that at that moment even he would have 
acknowledged any ‘compulsion to abdicate’» and CHRIST, 20032, 122, who merely claims 
that Sulla could stay in office «so lange er wolle». VALGIGLIO, 1956, 66 correctly explains 
that «l’illimitatezza era solo potenziale, non giuridica». SORDI, 1993, 86 asserts also that «In 
modo coerente con la funzione che gli era stata affidata Silla aveva abdicato dalla dittatura 
al termine della sua opera repressiva e legislativa, mostrando di ritenere ancora il potere 
dittatoriale delimitato, se non da una scadenza precedentemente stabilita, almeno da una 
funzione costituzionale». See in the same sense also SEAGER, 1992, 199: «It perhaps needs to 
be emphasized that Sulla was not appointed dictator for life. The definition of his mission, 
broad though it was, constituted in itself a kind of time-limit, albeit an inevitably vague one. 
It was taken for granted that when Sulla had completed that mission according to his lights 
he would lay down his dictatorship, and there is nothing but the anachronistic surprise of 
later sources to suggest that Sulla himself considered for a moment the possibility of trying 
to retain his power for life». 
12. Cf. n. 4 supra for a summary of Coli’s most important findings.
13. Cf. VALGIGLIO, 1956, 65: «Abbiamo qui un’ analogia colla dittatura repubblicana: 
Silla doveva mantenere il potere finché lo esigesse la situazione politica, e non oltre». Cf. in 
the same sense KEAVENEY, 1982, 165: «Like previous dictators, Sulla had been appointed to 
end a crisis, and when he had done that he resigned his office». Keaveney, however, asserts 
that the clause which allowed Sulla to hold power for as long as was necessary to remedy 
the situation was no vague formula but rather a literal injunction to be strictly obeyed. In 
my opinion, this argument is less plausible, since Sulla was the ultimate authority capable 
of determining when his task would be completed. 
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2. THE DATE AND MODALITIES OF SULLA’S ABDICATION OF THE DICTATORSHIP.
The timing of Sulla’s voluntary abdication remains a matter of deep 
scholarly division. On the one hand, there are a significant number of 
historians who argue that he abandoned his plenipotentiary office at the 
outset of 79, amongst whom Th. Mommsen, F. Fröhlich, W. Drumann and 
P. Groebe, H. Last, R. Syme, L. Pareti, H. Volkmann, B. Wosnik, C. Meier, 
I. Shatzman, A. Giovannini, A.B. Jenkins, J. Fündling, and J. Tatum14. They 
mostly refer to Appian B.C. 1.103, to be quoted in full and discussed 
shortly. Following E. Badian, however, a steadily growing number of 
scholars believe that Sulla laid his dictatorship down on the first day of 80, 
or sometime in the later months of 8115, whilst others still opt for the last 
day of 80 or sometime earlier that year16. Although I had already argued in 
2004 for the older view that Sulla abdicated only at the outset of 79, there 
is good cause to put the matter under the magnifying glass yet again. 
First, I then overlooked what I believe is some key evidence in support 
of the later date17. Second, such distinguished scholars as F. Hinard and A. 
14. MOMMSEN, 19039, 367 («bald nachdem die neuen Konsuln Publius Servilius und 
Appius Claudius ihr Amt angetreten hatten»); F. FRÖHLICH, 1900, c. 1562; DRUMANN & GROEBE, 
1902, 421f.; LAST, 1932, 309; SYME, 2016a, 61 (on the basis of App. B.C. 1.103 & Oros. 
5.21.1: «perhaps at the very beginning [of 79], certainly before the next elections» — in 
1964, 180, however, Syme asserts that «Sulla […] ceased to be dictator when he laid down 
the consulship [i.e., that of 80] on the last day of December»); PARETI, 1953, 637 (February 
79); VOLKMANN, 1958, 84; WOSNIK, 1963, 106-123; MEIER, 1966, 260 n. 348; SHATZMAN, 1968, 
345-347 (according to Shatzman, Sulla doubtlessly abdicated after the election of the 
consuls for 79 and before that of the consuls for 78); GIOVANNINI, 1983, 83; JENKINS, 1994, 
132; CHRIST, 20032, 133; FÜNDLING, 2010, 151; and TATUM, 2011, 164. 
15. BADIAN, 1962a, 230; 1962b, 61; 1967, 181; and esp. 1970, 8-14. Badian is followed 
by e.g. LAFFI, 1967, 261 n. 129; GABBA, 1972, 801, n. 236 & 803; HINARD, 1985, 259f. («avant 
la fin de l’année 81); WORTHINGTON, 1992, 189 with n. 13 (sometime before the end of 81); 
HURLET, 1993, 56-69, esp. 67-69, where Hurlet suggests that Sulla abdicated on the first of 
January 80, shortly before his inauguration as consul II (comp. also Hurlet 1992); LETZNER, 
2000, 295f.; DYCK, 2010, 4. 
16. Last day of 80 BCE: VALGIGLIO, 1956, 200f.; GABBA, 1958, 282f.; SYME, 1964, 180. 
GRUEN, 1968, 272 asserts that Sulla had resigned his dictatorship by 79. In 1974, 122, 
Gruen seems to be less decided: «But Sulla had retired from the dictatorship by mid-79 
[…] In 79 Sulla was a private citizen»). SCULLARD, 1982, 81 and EDER, 1997, 189, too, think 
Sulla abdicated sometime in 80. Although Diehl 1988, 25 does not entirely preclude the 
possibility that Sulla had already abdicated by the time of Cicero’s defense of Roscius 
Amerinus, he on p. 228 likewise argues that Sulla’s abdication of the dictatorship coincided 
with the end of his (second) consulship. SUMI, 2002, 429 seems to believe that Sulla was 
still dictator when Cicero defended Roscius in court. See also infra (e.g. n. 24) for a number 
of other scholars arguing for an abdication sometime in 81 or 80 BCE.
17. Esp. Cic. Off. 2.51 and Brut. 311f., quoted and discussed infra on p. 49f.
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Keaveney have meanwhile revisited the issue, looking to strengthen the 
case for an abdication sometime in 8118. The best approach remains a sys-
tematic empirical survey of the extant source materials, interpreted against 
the wider context of Sulla’s dictatorial mandate as outlined in the above. 
This analysis should also clarify the precise modalities of Sulla’s abdica-
tion, his distinct method of restoring political normality, and the wider 
historical significance of his actions. 
As indicated in the above, a number of leading ancient historians 
quote Appian B.C. 1.103 as unequivocal evidence for an abdication date 
early in 7919. The importance of this passage justifies citing it in full. After 
his summary of (the circumstances of) Sulla’s appointment to the dictator-
ship and the main events of his reign, Appian recounts the following: 
The following year [i.e., 80 BCE] Sulla, although he was dictator 
[my italics], undertook the consulship a second time, with [Q. Caecilius] 
Metellus Pius for his colleague, in order to preserve the pretence and 
form of democratic government. It is perhaps from this example that the 
Roman emperors appoint consuls for the country and even sometimes 
nominate themselves, considering it not unbecoming to hold the office 
of consul in connection with the supreme power. The next year [i.e., 79 
BCE] the people, in order to pay court to Sulla, chose him consul again, 
but he refused the office and nominated Servilius Isauricus and Claudius 
Pulcher, and voluntarily laid down the supreme power, although 
nobody interfered with him. […] Undaunted by the relatives of these 
persons [i.e. those who had perished in the proscriptions] at home, or 
by those banished abroad, or by the cities whose towers and walls he 
18. HINARD, 1999 & 2008 (essentially a reprint of the argument in id. 2011[2007], 43-49 
& 56-60) and KEAVENEY, 2005a, discussed more extensively infra.
19. Even though KEAVENEY, 2005a argues for an abdication sometime in 81, early 
enough «for him to make a grand and meaningful gesture of renunciation» (p. 439), he 
concedes that Appian’s treatment of the Sullan dominatio «is largely accurate».
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had thrown down and whose lands, money and privileges he had swept 
away, Sulla now proclaimed himself a private citizen.
In other words, Appian here emphatically records that Sulla combined 
his dictatorship with his second consulship in 80, and that he decided to do 
so for political reasons, as he wished to be seen as an adherent of collegial 
consular rule, one of the cornerstones the Res Publica libera20. Appian fur-
ther observes that this remarkable development may constitute the prece-
dent for key features of the imperial system, where Emperors designate the 
consuls and at times combined their position with that of consul. Whereas 
Appian misdates to 79 Sulla’s election to what would have been his third 
consulate and the subsequent renuntiatio of the consuls of 79, P. Servilius 
Vatia Isauricus and Ap. Claudius Pulcher, he still records that Sulla’s abdica-
tion of the dictatorship took place during the year after his second consu-
late21. In 1.104, Appian goes on to recount that Sulla made a speech in the 
Forum when he laid down his office ( ), in which he 
offered to give the reasons for what he had done to anybody who should 
ask them. Thanks to Quintilian, we also know he did so before a contio22. 
He then «dismissed the lictors with their axes» (
) — unequivocal evidence he still held his dictator- 
ship sine prouocatione — and discontinued his bodyguard. After this, he 
walked the Forum for a long time with only a few friends, in the gaze 
of an awed multitude23. Only once, when he was going home, Sulla was 
allegedly reviled by a boy who even dared to follow as him there as 
nobody moved to restrain him. Sulla reportedly endured his reproaches 
with remarkable calmness and is said to have prophesied that «this young 
20. For the inextricable connection between libertas and the consulship, see Tac. 
Ann. 1.1: Libertatem et consulatum L. Brutus instituit.
21. KEAVENEY, 2005a, 431, too, concludes that «when Appian B.C. 1.103 uses the words 
 he is talking of the dictatorship, irrespective of whether he means it 
as ‘great power’ or ‘great office’». On p. 432, Keaveney discerningly observes that the 
«notion that Sulla held the dictatorship right through 80 is also reflected in Appian’s use 
of Olympiad dating. According to Appian B.C. 1.99, Rome in the 175th Olympiad was 
under kingly i.e. dictatorial government. Games were given then which lured athletes from 
Greece. V. J. Matthews has shown that the games in question are the Ludi Victoriae of 80. 
Thus we may see illustrated yet again Appian’s belief that Sulla held the dictatorship in 80».
22. Quint. Inst. 3.9.53: Sullae dictaturam deponentis in contione.
23. In B.C. 1.3, Appian likewise relates that Sulla was the first Roman who held tyran-
nical power and had the courage to lay it down voluntarily and to declare that he would 
render an account of his official acts to any who were dissatisfied with them. Appian 
points out that for a considerable period, Sulla walked to the Forum as a private citizen 
in the sight of all and returned home unmolested, and explains that the onlookers either 
stood still very much in awe of his government, or were still amazed at his laying it down. 
41FREDERIK J. VERVAET
THE DATE, MODALITIES AND LEGACY OF SULLA’S ABDICATION OF HIS DICTATORSHIP:  
A STUDY IN SULLAN STATECRAFT
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / CC BY-NC-ND Stud. hist., H.ª antig., 36, 2018, pp. 31-82
man will prevent any future holder of such power from laying it down». 
Appian subsequently indicates that Sulla eventually retired from Rome 
after becoming a private citizen to pass his time in solitude on his country 
estate ( ) 
in Cumae, where he spent the remainder of his life hunting and fishing. In 
B.C. 1.105, then, Appian recounts that civil strife was gradually renewed 
«directly after his abdication» ( ) as a consequence 
of M. Aemilius Lepidus’ bold decision to run for the consulship of 78. 
First, Appian’s account shows that Sulla became a mere private citizen 
following his formal resignation from the dictatorship, and that he then 
at some point decided to retire to Cumae. Second, his bold and dramatic 
abdication would have been a hollow pièce de théâtre had he performed 
it as consul designatus24. Therefore, Appian’s narrative suggests that Sulla 
abdicated his office shortly after Servilius Isauricus and Ap. Claudius en-
tered upon their consulship, rather than after their renuntatio. Appian’s 
representation — as well as his mild confusion between, on the one hand, 
creatio/renuntiatio and, on the other, inire magistratum — is echoed in 
Orosius 5.22.1, where we can read that Sulla finally became a private citi-
zen «after the election of Servilius Isauricus and Claudius Pulcher»: Creatis 
itaque P. Seruilio et Appio Claudio consulibus uisus est tandem Sylla pri-
uatus. Although this does not necessarily contradict the hypothesis that 
Sulla laid his office down after his second consulate had expired, it is 
quite possible that Orosius here intended to communicate that Sulla re-
signed immediately after the consuls of 79 entered upon their office, albeit 
24. Contra SUMNER, 1964, 45 n. 44; TWYMAN, 1976, 77-97 & 271-295 (where it is argued 
that Sulla abdicated his dictatorship in the summer of 80, after the election of the consuls 
of 79); KUNKEL & WITTMANN, 1995, 711; and ECKERT, 2016, 190f n. 101, who all argue Sulla 
abdicated his dictatorship sometime in the second half of 80. Sumner (loc. cit.) believes 
this to have happened either at the end of 80, at the same time as laying down the con-
sulship, but thinks immediately after the elections for 79 «equally probable. Hence about 
August, on the assumption that the regular post-Sullan election dates […] were now insti-
tuted by Sulla». Twyman’s main argument that Appian fails to distinguish between renun-
tiatio and magistratum inire, and merely indicates in B.C. 1.103 that Sulla was dictator as 
well as consul designatus, fails to convince: regardless of this issue, Appian is adamant that 
Sulla combined the offices of dictator and consul. Although SEAGER, 1992, 205 rightly points 
out that Sulla’s challenging anyone who wanted to call him to account would be curiously 
hollow had he done this on the last day of 81, when he and everyone else knew perfectly 
well that on the next morning, he would once more hold imperium and be attended by 
lictors, he argues that «it is therefore tempting to believe that Sulla, who understood the 
theatre, gave up his dictatorship long enough before the end of 81 for his gesture to have 
at least some dramatic force».
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by virtue of a truncated — and potentially confusing — summary25. In this 
respect, one should also add that Sulla could not have become a private 
citizen following the election of the consuls of 79 since he held his second 
consulship throughout 80. 
Plutarch’s account in Sull. 34.3-5 allows for further refinement of this 
picture. Plutarch here recounts that Sulla, after having slaughtered a great 
number of citizens and introducing a great many constitutional changes, 
laid down his office and «made the People master of the consular elec-
tions (again)»: 
. Plutarch next explains that when the comitia consularia 
were held, Sulla did not go near them himself, but walked up and down 
the Forum like a private citizen, making himself freely available to all 
who wished to call him to account: 
. 
Finally, he goes on to say that when the People subsequently elected 
M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 78), contrary to Sulla’s wishes but owing to 
Cn. Pompeius’ zealous electioneering the former confined himself to giv-
ing the latter a severe and prophetic rebuke that he was strengthening 
his own adversary26. Plutarch clearly amalgamates the events of Sulla’s 
abdication in contione on the Forum with those surrounding the ominous 
25. Comp. SUMNER, 1964, 45 n. 44: «Orosius, v, 22, jumps from the elections to the 
1st January, 79». KEAVENEY, 2005a, 424 conducts a brief examination of Orosius’ usage of 
creare consulem in a technical sense and observes that «plainly the matter did not interest 
him». Keaveney goes on to argue that «two passages, however, are suggestive. In 4.18.17 
the election of Scipio Africanus (cos. 205) leads on immediately to his expedition to Africa, 
although we know that did not actually take place until 204. Thus here in this case we 
have unambiguous evidence for the kind of thing Sumner thought might be found in 
5.22.1. The issue however is complicated by 5.7.1. Here the election of Scipio Aemilianus 
to the consulship of 134 is described as occurring in that same year. Plainly Orosius was 
not consistent in his treatment». In my view, all three of these passages in Orosius show his 
tendency to conflate the procedures of creatio and initio magistratum, which suggests that 
he in 5.22.1 indeed wanted to record that Sulla became a private citizen after the consuls 
of 79 entered upon their office. The very fact that Orosius knows that Sulla held the office 
of dictator (see 5.21.12: Sylla dictator creatus est) but is ignorant of the consulship, as 
cleverly observed by KEAVENEY (loc. cit.) further strengthens the conclusion that, at least 
according to Orosius, Sulla became a private citizen by abdicating his dictatorship after the 
consuls of 79 had taken up office.
26. See also Plut. Pomp. 15 for this episode. Sulla reprimanded Pompeius as he was 
passing through the Forum with a throng. For Lepidus’ genuine popularity with the com-
mons, see Ps.-Asc. 206 [Orelli = 259, 1-3 ed. Stangl], where it is recorded that Metellus 
Celer and Metellus Nepos dropped their prosecution of Lepidus eius apud populum gratia.
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comitia consularia for 7827. An abdication in the immediate run-up to the 
electoral comitia is incompatible with the tradition of genuinely free elec-
tions; therefore, Sulla must have abdicated well before the start of can-
vassing. The key point, however, is that Plutarch closely connects Sulla’s 
resignation from the dictatorship with the restoration of fully free con-
sular and praetorian elections in 7928. His narrative unequivocally con-
firms that Sulla witnessed these as a private citizen and strongly suggests 
that, just like Pompeius, he actively canvassed on behalf of certain candi-
dates whilst staying away from the actual comitia in the Campus Martius29. 
Disaffected with Lepidus’ handsome election to consul prior and weary 
of politics, Sulla then probably departed Rome for his country estate in 
Cumae30. The combined evidence of Appian and Plutarch thus also ex-
27. This has confused both CARCOPINO, 1931, 208f. and SYME, 2016a, 74, who asserts 
that Plutarch in Sull. 34 connects Sulla’s abdication «with the expectation that the undesir-
able Lepidus would win the consulate».
28. Correctly so SCARDIGLI, 1979, 96; compare also KEAVENEY, 2005a, 426: «When he 
[i.e., Plutarch] has Sulla leave off his  we may translate this as ‘office’ or ‘power’ but it 
does not matter which. As no other office has been mentioned we are dealing with either 
the dictatorship itself or the power it confers. That is the logic of the narrative. The offer to 
give an account of his doings can then be seen as a reference to the fact that dictators were 
liable to prosecution after they had left office [cf. LINTOTT, 1999, 111-113]. The reference to 
Lepidus’ victory puts us in 79». Contra ECKERT, 2016, 190f. n. 101: «Der gerafften Darstellung 
Plutarchs ist jedoch nicht klar zu entnehmen, ob die Konsulatswahlen für 80, 79 oder für 
78 v.Chr. gemeint sind».
29. Keaveney, who likewise accepts that Plutarch’s representation in Sull. 34 dates 
Sulla’s abdication to 79 (cf. n. 28 supra), argues in 2005a, 426 that Plut. Comp. Lys. Sull. 1.4 
(
) «but he [i.e., Sulla], when he had 
once been chosen leader of an army, remained in arms for ten years together, making 
himself now consul, and now dictator, but always being a tyrant), too, puts the end of the 
dictatorship in 79: «Self-evidently hostile in tone it says that once Sulla was elected head 
of the army he remained in arms for the ten consecutive years appointing himself consul, 
proconsul and dictator. In other words, we have here, by inclusive reckoning, the period 
88 to 79». As Sulla assumed command of a sizeable army in 90 BCE, probably in the capac-
ity of legatus pro praetore (see BROUGHTON, MRR 2, 29 & 36 and, esp., DART, 2014, 119, 133 
& 139f.), I would be inclined to argue that Plutarch’s decade of ‘Sulla under arms’ rather 
concerns the years 90 to 81 inclusive, excluding the year of his second consulship, marked 
by a more civil political regimen. If one accepts that Sulla abdicated his dictatorship at the 
outset of 79, as argued in this study, the period 88 up to and including 79 becomes even 
more unlikely.
30. Plutarch records in Pomp. 15.2 that Lepidus was proclaimed consul by a larger 
vote than Catulus thanks to Pompeius’ zealous electioneering on his behalf. For Lepidus’ 
ranking first in the Fasti Triumphales as consul prior, see Degrassi Inscr. Ital. 13.1, 56. On 
the significance and prestige of being consul prior, see VERVAET, 2014a, 34f. In B.C. 1.104, 
Appian recounts that Sulla was still in good shape when he retired to the countryside and 
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plodes Carcopino’s suggestion that Sulla abdicated only shortly after the 
comitia consularia for 7831.
Sulla’s abdication early in 79 enabled the consuls Servilius Isauricus 
and Ap. Claudius to govern the Republic in their own right and, amongst 
other things, preside over genuinely free electoral comitia. As such, it 
marked the culmination of the return to political normality signalled by 
his election to a second consulship in mid-81. Appian’s observation (in 
B.C. 1.103, supra) that Sulla purposely undertook a second consulship 
«in order to preserve the pretence and form of democratic government» 
indeed strongly suggests that this decision was intended as a signal indica-
tor that normal political life was now to resume its course, regardless of 
the fact that Sulla chose to continue his dictatorship throughout his tenure 
as consul II. 
It is precisely against this background of a carefully staged political 
normalization that one should interpret a number of passages from the 
work of Cicero and Plutarch quoted by Pareti and especially Badian as 
suggests that he was weary of war, power, and Rome. Although SYME, 2016a, 62 rightly 
observes that «the nexus between Lepidus’ candidature and Sulla’s abdication is wholly 
fallacious» (see also 2016b), Plutarch’s evidence does indicate that Sulla retired from Rome 
following the outcome of the consular elections for 78. 
31. CARCOPINO, 1931, 208f. (with reference to Plut. Sull. 34). Although BROUGHTON, 
MRR 2, 82 at first accepted Carcopino’s chronology, he in his Supplement to the Magistrates 
of the Roman Republic (Ann Arbor 1960), 75 asserts that a date later than 80 is very 
unlikely. For a sustained critique of Carcopino’s thesis (1931, 186-211) that Sulla really 
had monarchical ambitions but was ultimately forced to abdicate following the consular 
elections of 79 by a coalition of his own supporters led by Pompeius, the Metelli and their 
kinsmen and associates, see SYME, 2016a, 64-78; comp. HURLET, 1993, 58-62. SYME, 2016a is 
very critical of Carcopino’s liberties with the sources but oddly enough (pp. 75-77) throws 
out Plutarch’s (and even Sallust’s: op. cit. 78 and 2016c) evidence concerning Pompeius’ 
defiance of Sulla and Lepidus’ hostility before his election and Sulla’s death, instead 
speculating that the latter «enjoyed the approbation of Sulla and the aristocracy» and that 
only Lepidus and Lutatius Catulus had been allowed to stand for the consulship of 78. 
Nonetheless, he (2016a, 72) does accept Plutarch’s note that Sulla passed Pompeius over 
in his will, suggesting this was due to Pompeius’ «inordinate ambition». Although some 
scholars (e.g. THEIN, 2002, 356 n. 1375) believe Sallust wrongly has the consul M. Aemilius 
Lepidus claim in an address to the people delivered early in 78 (see J. T. Ramsay’s masterly 
2015 edition in the LCL series, 38-49), when Sulla was still alive, that he continued to 
tyrannize Rome, his tirade against the ongoing ‘domination of Sulla’ doubtlessly represents 
a rhetorical device: Lepidus’ ultimate goal was the annulment of contested Sullan legislation 
(cf. BROUGHTON, MRR 2, 85), and as he saw it, Sulla’s tyranny would continue as long as 
these laws stood. That said, Lepidus’ portrayal of Sulla’s reign makes more sense if we 
accept he remained in the dictatorship throughout 81 and 80.
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proof positive of an abdication as early as on the first day of 8032, namely 
Rosc. Am. 139 and Sull. 6.5. 
In §139 of his Pro Roscio Amerino, a speech firmly dated to 80 BCE33, 
Cicero makes the following intriguing statement:
Dum necesse erat resque ipsa cogebat, unus omnia poterat; 
qui posteaquam magistratus creauit legesque constituit, sua cuique 
procuratio auctoritasque est restituta. 
While it was necessary and the state of affairs demanded, one 
man alone possessed all power; but after he created magistrates and 
established laws, everyone’s sphere of duty and authority was restored 
to him.
32. BADIAN, 1970, 8-14 (on p. 11, Badian suggests that Sulla «abdicated his dictatorship 
on becoming consul (inconspicuously dismissing twelve lictors at the time of the change-
over)»; comp. already BADIAN, 1962b, 61. Consequently, BADIAN, 1970, 8-11 has little choice 
but to argue that the  in App. B.C. 1.103 as well as 
the  in Plut. Sull. 34.3 (both discussed supra) simply indicate that Sulla 
laid down ‘a magistracy’, and that this in fact was his second consulate — a poor attempt at 
explaining away some inconvenient evidence. The wording in Appian and Plutarch unam-
biguously reflects the voluntary act of se magistratu abdicare, legally required for dictators, 
as opposed to the automatic magistratu abire at the end of a consul’s tenure — Appian (loc. 
cit.) attests that Sulla duly proclaimed himself a private citizen: . In 
his magisterial study of 1953, Coli conclusively demonstrates that annual magistracies (the 
so-called magistracies ad tempus certum) lapsed de iure at the end of their official term, 
whereas the non-annual magistracies (the so-called magistracies ad tempus incertum) only 
lapsed following the incumbent’s formal abdication or death, regardless of whether their 
comminatory tempus, the set maximum time for the achievement of their specific task, had 
expired. For a summary of Coli’s main findings, see n. 4 supra.
33. In 15.28, Gellius records that Cicero, born on 3 January in the consulship of Q. 
(Servilius) Caepio and C. (not Q.) (Atilius) Serranus (i.e., 106 BCE), brilliantly defended 
Sex. Roscius at the age of twenty-seven, in the consulship of L. Sulla Felix (for the second 
time) and Metellus Pius — annos iam septem atque uiginti natus, L. Sulla Felice II. Q. 
Metello Pio consulibus, invalidating Cornelius Nepos’ (impossible) claim that he did so at 
the age of twenty-three. Gellius also recounts that Asconius Pedanius noted that Fenestella 
mistakenly wrote that Cicero pleaded for Sex. Roscius in the twenty-sixth year of his age. 
That Cicero was twenty-six when he spoke in defense of Roscius is also on record in 
Quint. Inst. 12.6.4: quae cum sex et uiginti natus annos summis audientibus clamoribus 
dixerit. The discrepancy between, on the one hand, A. Gellius and Asconius Pedianus, 
and, on the other, Fenestella and Quintilian, can easily be explained in that the former 
count the (consular) years inclusively (106 up to and including 80, making for 27 years), 
whereas the latter reckon from his date of birth (Cicero being indeed twenty-six as from 3 
January 80). A date of 80 for the Pro Roscio is accepted by, amongst others, HUMBERT, 1925, 
100-111; SYME, 2016a, 61 («probably delivered in the first half of the year»); DIEHL, 1988, 56; 
and DYCK, 2010, 4. Dyck (ix) describes Cicero’s Pro Roscio as a «career-making» and «risky» 
speech, «in which the young C. excoriates a favorite of the powerful Sulla besides taking 
rhetorical risks».
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As noted by Dyck, there is similar use of the past tense at §91: 
Dum is in aliis rebus erat occupatus, qui summam rerum 
administrabat, erant interea, qui suis uulneribus mederentur.
While he who wielded the supreme power was occupied with 
other matters, there were some who in the meantime were attending to 
their own wounds.
Well before Badian, Pareti had already quoted Rosc. Am. 131 as evi-
dence that Cicero delivered his speech in defense of Roscius Amerinus 
after Sulla had abdicated from the dictatorship34: 
 Quid miramur, iudices, L. Sullam, cum solus rem publicam regeret 
orbemque terrarum gubernaret imperiique maiestatem, quam armis 
receperat, legibus confirmaret, aliaqua animaduertere non potuisse?
Why then, judges, should we be surprised if Sulla at a time when 
he alone ruled the Republic and governed the world, when he was 
strengthening by laws the majesty of his supreme power which he had 
regained by force of arms, should unavoidably have allowed a few 
things to pass unnoticed?
In point of fact, Cicero had already made similar observations earlier 
in his address, viz. in Rosc. Am. 22, where he is also quick to exculpate 
Sulla and pay tribute to his prized felicitas:
Neque enim mirum, cum eodem tempore et ea, quae praeterita 
sunt, reparet et ea, quae uidentur instare, praeparet, cum et pacis 
constituendae rationem et belli gerendi potestatem solus habeat, cum 
omnes in unum spectent, unus omnia gubernet, cum tot tantisque 
negotiis distentus sit, ut respirare libere non possit, si aliquid non 
animaduertat, cum praesertim tam multi occupationem eius obseruent 
tempusque aucupentur ut, simul atque ille despexerit, aliquid huiusce 
modi moliantur. Huc accedit, quod, quamuis ille felix sit, sicut est, tamen 
in tanta felicitate nemo potest esse in magna familia, qui neminem 
neque seruum neque libertum improbum habeat.
For at the time when he is repairing the past and preparing for 
the possible emergencies of the future; when he alone possesses the 
means of establishing peace and the power to wage war; when all 
eyes are fixed upon him alone, and he alone is absolute ruler; when 
34. PARETI, 1953, 640 with n. 2 — Pareti, however, wrongly dates the defense of 
Roscius to 79 rather than 80. With Pareti and Badian, TWYMAN, 1976, 87 accepts these 
passages as evidence Sulla no longer held his dictatorship when Cicero took up the 
defense of Roscius. KEAVENEY, 2005a, 433f. convincingly discredits Twyman’s (op. cit. 89, n. 
47) suggestion that Cic. Dom. 79, too, could possibly indicate that Sulla no longer held the 
dictatorship in 80.
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he is distracted by so many and so important affairs that he cannot 
even breathe freely, we ought not be surprised if something escapes his 
notice, especially as so many are on the look-out for the time when he 
is busy and are watching for an opportunity, as soon as he is off-guard, 
to start some such plan as this. Add to this that, although he is fortunate, 
as he really is, no one can be so fortunate as not to have some dishonest 
slave or freedman in a large household35.
There can indeed be no doubt that Cicero here alludes to an impor-
tant turning point in Sulla’s administration of public affairs after the end 
of the civil war. Nonetheless, his words need not imply that Sulla abdi-
cated his dictatorship in 8136. Had this really been the case, Cicero could 
easily have said so in plain language (in Rosc. Am. 139): qui posteaquam 
magistratus creauit legesque constituit abdicauit or simply qui posteaq-
uam abdicauit. Instead, his carefully chosen words imply that the dictator 
decided to relax his regime in conspicuous fashion. Indeed, Cicero here 
strongly suggests that, sometime after Sulla had presided over the elec-
toral comitia for 81 and achieved the bulk of his legislative program, he 
issued an edict proclaiming a normalization of public life and inviting the 
traditional political entities to resume their customary roles37. In point of 
fact, it is not unlikely that Cicero here paraphrases the very terms of this 
35. In Rosc. Am. 127, Cicero likewise goes to great lengths to praise and exonerate 
Sulla: In quem hoc dicam, quaeris, Eruci. Non in eum, quem uis et putas; nam Sullam 
et oratio mea ab initio et ipsius eximia uirtus omni tempore purgauit. Ego haec omnia 
Chrysogonum fecisse dico: «Do you ask, against whom my words are directed? Not against 
whom you desire and think them to be, for my own speech from the very beginning and 
his own eminent virtue at all times have exonerated Sulla. I hold that all this is the work of 
Chrysogonus». DIEHL, 1988, 228 likewise argues that the subtlety of Cicero’s criticism in §22 
as well as in §131 (nemo est enim, qui nesciat propter magnitudinem rerum multa multos 
partim inuito, partim imprudente L. Sulla commisisse. Placet igitur in his rebus aliquid 
imprudentia praeteriri? Non placuit, iudices, sed necesse est: «For everybody knows that 
many men have privately committed many crimes of which Sulla partly disapproved and 
partly was ignorant, owing to the multitude of his undertakings. Does it seem right, then, 
that in matters of this kind anything should be overlooked through inattention? It does 
not seem right, gentlemen, but it is inevitable») suggests that Sulla was still dictator when 
Cicero spoke in defense of Roscius: «Wäre dies nicht mehr der Fall gewesen, hätte Cicero 
in seiner Rede dem gewiß starker Rechnung tragen müssen». Compare also Sumi 2002, 429 
for the observation that Cicero, «while no mouthpiece for the regime», here pays lip service 
to Sullan pax and felicitas. 
36. Compare Gelzer’s clever observation in 1932, 606 that Cicero here «mit aller 
Deutlichkeit die Rückkehr zu verfassungsmäßigen Zuständen als die damalige Richtung 
der Politik kennzeichnet».
37. The evidence in Cic. Rosc. Am. 139 (supra) and App. B.C. 1.99-101 (esp. 100, 
quoted infra) strongly suggests that Sulla made the organization of the electoral comitia for 
81 his first item of business after his appointment to the dictatorship, and that he presided 
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momentous edict. As Cicero’s tricky defense of Roscius Amerinus took 
place while Sulla was still retaining his plenipotentiary dictatorship, he 
had no choice but to pay lip service to the latter’s solemn ‘return to nor-
malcy’ proclamation, to use United States’ presidential candidate Warren 
G. Harding’s campaign slogan in the election of 192038. 
As for the precise timing of this edict inviting the traditional bodies 
of state to resume their role and authority, we are not entirely clueless 
either. Cicero clearly indicates that the edict followed after Sulla had pre-
sided over the electoral comitia for 81 and pushed through the bulk of 
his comprehensive legislative program. Evidently, the edict would have 
made little sense if issued before the consuls (and other magistrates) of 81 
had entered upon their office. Appian provides further information in B.C. 
1.100, where we are told that Sulla continued to tower over Roman politi-
cal life regardless of the election of M. Tullius Decula and Cn. Cornelius 
Dolabella to the consulship of 81: 
Nevertheless, by way of keeping up the form of the Republic, he 
allowed them [i.e. the Roman people, cf. B.C. 1.99] to appoint consuls. 
Marcus Tullius and Cornelius Dolabella were chosen. But Sulla, like 
a reigning sovereign, was dictator over the consuls. Twenty-four axes 
were borne in front of him as dictator, the same number that were 
borne before the ancient kings, and he also had a large bodyguard. He 
repealed laws and enacted others.
The combined evidence of Cicero and Appian suggests that Sulla first 
completely overshadowed the consuls of 81 and next slackened the reins 
after completing his substantial legislative work39. 
As a matter of fact, there is some further evidence in Cicero invalidat-
ing the interpretation of Rosc. Am. 139 as evidence for an abdication in 
over the elections — contra KEAVENEY, 2005, 427, who argues that the interrex Valerius 
Flaccus in 82 presided over the elections of the consuls of 81. 
38. CARWELL, 2016, 47. 
39. Contra SYME, 2016a, 61, who suggests that Cicero in Rosc. Am. 139 «proclaims an 
aspiration rather than a fact», arguing that the ‘advocate appeals to the nobiles to resume 
their station and their duties in all confidence. So long as it was inevitable, a single man 
held sole power. But the situation has changed; Sulla has appointed magistrates and 
ordained laws».
49FREDERIK J. VERVAET
THE DATE, MODALITIES AND LEGACY OF SULLA’S ABDICATION OF HIS DICTATORSHIP:  
A STUDY IN SULLAN STATECRAFT
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / CC BY-NC-ND Stud. hist., H.ª antig., 36, 2018, pp. 31-82
81. First and foremost, there is Off. 2.51, where he makes the following 
boastful statement: 
Maxime autem et gloria paritur et gratia defensionibus, eoque 
maior, si quando accidit, ut ei subueniatur, qui potentis alicuius opibus 
circumueniri urgerique uideatur, ut nos et saepe alias et adulescentes 
contra L. Sullae dominantis opes pro Sex. Roscio Amerino fecimus, quae, 
ut scis, extat oratio. 
Then, too, briefs for the defense are most likely to bring glory and 
popularity to the pleader, and all the more so, if ever it falls to him 
to lend his aid to one who seems to be oppressed and persecuted by 
the influence of someone in power. This I have done on many other 
occasions; and once in particular, in my younger days, I defended Sextus 
Roscius of Ameria against the domination of Lucius Sulla. The speech is 
published, as you know.
These words can hardly mean anything else than that Sulla was still 
holding his dreaded dictatorial powers at the time of Roscius’ trial and 
Cicero’s courageous defense40.
That Roscius’ trial took place while Sulla was still invested with his 
fearsome dictatorship can also be inferred from a couple of other passag-
es from the works of Cicero and Plutarch. In Brut. 311f., after producing a 
brief conspectus of the difficult circumstances, Cicero has the following to 
say about the beginnings of his career:
Tumultus interim recuperanda re publica et crudelis interitus 
oratorum trium, Scaevolae Carbonis Antisti, reditus Cottae Curionis 
40. In 2008, 57, n. 80, Hinard makes a rather poor attempt at explaining away 
inconvenient evidence: «On observera d’ailleurs que, lorsqu’il évoque le discours 
qu’il a prononcé pour défendre Sex. Roscius accusé de parricide, Cicéron écrit qu’il a 
mené ce combat contra L. Sulla dominantis opes. Il ne fait aucun doute que, s’il avait 
pu, il aurait écrit contra L. Sullae dictatoris dominationem». The words contra L. Sulla 
dominantis opes speak for themselves as regards Sulla’s position at the time and will have 
been perfectly clear to contemporaries. Hinard’s subsequent explanation (op. cit., 105) 
is equally unconvincing: «Il ne faut pas se tromper sur le sens des mots: je ne crois pas 
que Cicéron ait voulu dire qu’il avait parlé “à l’encontre de la puissance de L. Sylla”. La 
formule, qui vient en conclusion d’un développement sur la morale de l’éloquence, est 
destinée à illustrer la gloire et la reconnaissance qui, au rebours des risques de l’accusation, 
retombent sur l’avocat de la défense, surtout quand il se trouve (si quando accidit ut) en 
face de puissances qui menacent et circonviennent l’accusé, “ce que j’ai fait dans le pro 
Roscio”, écrit-il, ce qui revient à expliquer la tactique d’avocat qu’il a employée, non un 
acte politique d’une résistance qu’il aurait menée. Et il en a certainement retiré, en effet, 
une grande gloire d’avocat et une grande gratitude: il s’était concilié les bonnes grâces 
d’une partie de la nobilitas». Hinard here distorts Cicero’s meaning and intent, and mere 
disbelief is insufficient argument against unwelcome evidence. 
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Crassi Lentulorum Pompei; leges et iudicia constituta, recuperata res 
publica; ex numero autem oratorum Pomponius Censorinus Murena 
sublati. tum primum nos ad causas et priuatas et publicas adire 
coepimus, non ut in foro disceremus, quod plerique fecerunt, sed ut, 
quantum nos efficere potuissemus, docti in forum ueniremus. Eodem 
tempore Moloni dedimus operam; dictatore enim Sulla legatus ad 
senatum de Rhodiorum praemiis uenerat. itaque prima causa publica 
pro Sex. Roscio dicta tantum commendationis habuit, ut non ulla esset 
quae non digna nostro patrocinio uideretur. deinceps inde multae, quas 
nos diligenter elaboratas et tamquam elucubratas adferebamus. 
There was a violent struggle meanwhile to recover the Republic; and 
the barbarous slaughter of three orators, Scaevola, Carbo, and Antistius; 
the return of Cotta, Curio, Crassus, the Lentuli, and Pompeius; the laws 
and law courts were set up, and the Republic was restored; but we 
lost Pomponius, Censorinus, and Murena from the roll of orators. I now 
began, for the first time, to engage in cases, both private and public, not, 
as most did, with a view to learning my profession in the Forum, but, 
as much as I could manage it, to appearing in the Forum as an expert. 
At this time I took lessons from Molon, for while Sulla was dictator 
he had come to the Senate as an envoy, to negotiate the rewards 
due to the Rhodians. And so my first public case, spoken on behalf 
of Sex. Roscius, met with such a favourable reception, that every case 
was considered worthy of my expert guidance (patrocinium). And from 
that point onwards there were many cases which I pleaded once I had 
scrupulously developed them and spent many long hours over them.
The information here resonates well with what we are told in Rosc. 
Am. 139: first there was wholesale slaugher, then Sulla forced through his 
laws and reforms of the judiciary, so resurrecting the ruined Republic, 
and then continued as dictator at the time Cicero took up the defense of 
Sex. Roscius. This reappraisal of the wider political situation at the time of 
Roscius’ trial renders Cicero’s notable eagerness to remind people of his 
courage all the more understandable. This picture is further completed by 
Plutarch in Cic. 3.2f., where we are likewise told of Cicero’s career imme-
diately following his military service under Sulla in the Social War41, and 
how he was not as fearless as he would have wanted us to believe:
41. Plut. Cic. 3.2; DART, 2014, 27f. & 154; and PINA POLO, 2016a, 41: Cicero served in 
Picenum in 89 BCE under the command of the consul Cn. Pompeius Strabo.
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Then, seeing that the Republic was hurrying into factions, and 
from factions into unlimited monarchy, he betook himself to a retired 
and contemplative life, associated with Greek scholars, and pursued his 
studies, until Sulla got the mastery and the state appeared to be somewhat 
settled. About this time Chrysogonus, a freedman of Sulla’s, put up at 
public auction the estate of a man who, as it was said, had been put 
to death under proscription, and bought it in himself for two thousand 
drachmas. Then Roscius, the son and heir of the deceased, was indignant 
and set forth clearly that the estate was worth two hundred and fifty 
talents, whereupon Sulla, enraged to have his actions called in question, 
indicted Roscius for the murder of his father, Chrysogonus having trumped 
up the evidence. No advocate would help Roscius, but all avoided him 
through their fear of Sulla’s cruelty, and so at last, in his destitution, the 
young man had recourse to Cicero. Cicero’s friends encouraged him 
to undertake the case, arguing that he would never again have a more 
brilliant or a more honourable opportunity to win fame. Accordingly, he 
undertook the defense of Roscius, won his cause, and men admired him 
for it; but fearing Sulla, he made a journey to Greece, after spreading a 
report that his health needed attention. For in fact he was spare and lean, 
and owing to a weakness of the stomach could only with difficulty take a 
little light food late in the day; his voice, however, was full and strong, but 
harsh and unmodulated, and since, owing to the vehemence and passion 
of his oratory, it was always forced into the higher tones, it made men 
apprehensive for his health.
Though lacking in precise chronological detail, Plutarch’s narrative, 
too, unambiguously suggests that Sulla still held his formidable dictatura 
sine prouocatione when Cicero decided to take up the defense of Roscius, 
and that this remarkable act of bravery subsequently forced him to depart 
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for Greece under false pretext of failing health. As a sort of voluntary 
exile, Cicero spent his time there studying and returned to Rome to pur-
sue a political career only in 77, well after Sulla’s death42.
As indicated in the above, Badian also quotes Plut. Sull. 6.5 as firm 
evidence for his contention that Sulla abdicated his dictatorship on 1 
January 80. Plutarch here notes that Sulla seemed, 
to attribute more to Fortune than to his own excellence, and to make 
himself entirely the creature of this deity, since he accounts even his 
concord with Metellus, a man his equal in rank43, and a relative by 
marriage44, a piece of divine felicity; for whereas he expected much 
annoyance from him as a colleague in office, he found him most 
obliging.
Again, this passage does not preclude that Sulla continued his dicta-
torship throughout 80. In light of the above considerations, it rather con-
firms the notion that Sulla decided to present himself predominantly as 
consul in 80, eager to govern the Republic in harmonious conjunction 
with his colleague, Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius45. As the success of this 
strategy to revert to political normality following the completion of his 
legislative program was much hinged on Metellus’ willingness to cooper-
ate and play his part, Sulla’s profound satisfaction with the latter’s forth-
coming attitude becomes perfectly understandable46. In this context, it is 
42. Plut. Cic. 3.6-5.
43. Plutarch obviously refers to the fact that Metellus and Sulla were equals in terms 
of social standing, since both men had consular ancestors and stemmed from some of the 
noblest senatorial families, whereas in terms of senatorial and official status, Sulla out-
ranked Metellus in 81 as consular as well as dictator.
44. In 89 BCE, shortly after his election to his first consulship, Sulla had married 
Caecilia Metella Dalmatica, the widow of M. Aemilius Scaurus (cos. 115), whom he always 
treated with the greatest deference (Plut. Sull. 6.10-12).
45. Since Metellus had been one of Sulla’s foremost generals during the civil war pre-
ceding his dictatorship, together with Cn. Pompeius (cos. 70, 55 & 52), M. Licinius Crassus 
(cos. 70 & 55) and P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus (cos. 79) (cf. Plut. Sull. 28.8) and met the 
requirements of the Cornelian Law, having held the praetorship in 89 (BROUGHTON, MRR 2, 
79), Sulla could hardly have blocked him from running for office in 81. The dictator was 
probably keen on having a respectable stalwart of the senatorial nobility as his colleague 
in the consulship. 
46. As SUMI, 2002 compellingly argues that Sulla forged his own self-representation 
out of three personal virtues, viz. felicitas, Salus rerum and concordia (this last virtue 
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well worth calling to mind that Metellus Pius was one of the senatorial 
aristocracy’s foremost nobles, and that one of his younger relatives, one 
C. Metellus, had reportedly dared to question Sulla’s pre-proscription mas-
sacres in a meeting of the Senate late in 8247. 
Sulla’s decision to present a moderate and republican image as consul 
in 80 and his insistence on governing by means of that office is also re-
flected in the epigraphical record. Whereas Sulla is attested as dictator in 
inscriptions from 81, he is only ever termed consul II in inscriptions from 
80 and later48. As these inscriptions record senatus consulta and epistulae, 
discussed on pp. 425-428), his preoccupation with Metellus’ attitude as a fellow consul 
should not surprise at all. 
47. Cf. Plut. Sull. 31.1-3. For the fact that Metellus Pius had always been a staunch 
but stubborn and at times quarrelsome protagonist of the optimates before his consulship 
in 80 BCE, see MÜNZER, 1897, cc. 1221f. KEAVENEY, 2005a, 434f., however, believes that an 
incident recorded in Plut. Cic. 17.2-4 may provide further evidence that Sulla was merely 
consul in 80 BCE. Cicero here recounts the following story about the maverick patrician 
P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura (cos. 71): «It is said too that he got his surname of Sura for the 
following reason. In Sulla’s time he was quaestor and lost and wasted large amounts of 
the public moneys. Sulla was angry at this and demanded an accounting from him in the 
senate, whereupon Lentulus came forward with a very careless and contemptuous air and 
said that he would not give an account, but would offer his leg, as boys were accustomed 
to do when they were playing ball and made a miss. On this account he was surnamed 
Sura, for ‘sura’ is the Roman word for leg». If this incident occurred when Sulla was consul 
II, it merely underscores that he was determined to govern the Republic in the capacity of 
consul and therefore decided to show restraint in the face of Lentulus’ defiant gesture. On 
p. 435, Keaveney himself readily admits «that circumstances could sometimes lead Sulla to 
stay his hand and that not all who offended him suffered to the same degree». 
48. See SHERK, RGDE nrs. 18 (Senatus Consultum de Stratonicensibus) & 49 (Epistulae 
de Collegiis Artificum Bacchiorum) for Sulla being styled dictator in documents that must 
be dated to 81. For a striking example of an inscription recording a senatus consultum 
from 80 BCE which styles Sulla consul II, see SHERK, RDGE nr. 20, c. I, A, ll.1f. (Senatus 
Consultum de Thasiis): 
. In SHERK, op. cit., nr. 19 (Senatus 
Consultum de Cormis) Sulla is likewise recorded as consul II [ - - - - - - . 
In SHERK, op. cit., nr. 23, a senatorial decree of 73 (the Senatus Consultum Aliaque Acta de 
Oropiorum et Publicanorum Controuersiis), the year 80 is referred to as
 in ll. 52f. Compare also ILLRP 1006 = CIL 
1, 893 (p. 961): Bato / Attaleni / sp(ectauit) a(nte) d(iem) IV N(onas) Mar(tias) / L(ucio) 
Sul(la) Q(uinto) Met(ello). HURLET, 1993, 65 and HINARD, 2008, 57, however, are adamant 
that the epigraphical record plainly confirms Badian’s argument that Sulla abandoned the 
dictatorship in 81 BCE. Hinard (loc. cit.) also quotes Gell. 10.20.10 = Sall. Hist. 2 frag. 21 
(ed. Maurenbrecher, Leipzig 1893, 66) as evidence that Sulla only held the consulship in 80. 
In a discussion of the meaning of lex and priuilegium (a statute framed with regard to in-
dividuals), Gellius here recounts that: Sallustius quoque, proprietatum in uerbis retinentis-
simus, consuetudine concessit et priuilegium, quod de Cn. Pompei reditu ferebatur, «legem» 
appellauit. Verba ex secunda eius Historia haec sunt: «Nam Sullam consulem de reditu eius 
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documents originating from Rome, Sulla’s official position was unambigu-
ous: he insisted on governing the Republic as consul in 80 and conse-
quently wanted to be recorded as such, and only in this capacity, in any 
official measures. 
F. Hinard, however, is adamant that Dio 36.31.4 further strengthens 
the argument for an abdication sometime in 8149. In the context of his 
fiery speech against the rogatio Gabinia de uno imperatore contra prae-
dones constituendo of 67, in which he makes a strong case for the politi-
cal mos maiorum and against the conferral of excessive powers upon one 
man, Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 78) points to a couple of inauspicious past 
deviations from customary practice. Catulus for example explains that C. 
Marius (cos. 107, 104, 103, 102, 101, 100, 86) changed for the worse be-
cause he was entrusted with so many wars «in the shortest space of time 
and held the consulship six times in the briefest period». Catulus goes on 
to say that, 
legem ferentum ex conposito tr. pl. C. Herennius prohibuerat» — «Even Sallust, who is most 
observant of propriety in the use of words, has yielded to custom and applied the term 
‘law’ to the ‘privilege’ which was passed with reference to the return of Gnaeus Pompeius. 
The passage from the second book of the Histories reads as follows: ‘For when Sulla as 
consul proposed a law concerning his return, the tribune of the plebs, Gaius Herennius, 
had vetoed it by previous arrangement’». This fragment obviously recounts events that took 
place in Sulla’s troubled first consulship in 88 and concerns Cn. Pompeius Strabo, the con-
sul of 89, rather than his son, Cn. Pompeius Magnus. After a fruitless bid to get re-elected, 
he as proconsul in 88 possibly instigated the murder of Sulla’s colleague, Q. Pompeius 
Rufus, sent by the Senate to relieve him of the army command he was holding. In 87, as 
he continued to intrigue for a second consulship, he half-heartedly supported the consul 
Cn. Octavius against his renegade colleague L. Cornelius Cinna while maintaining secret 
negotiations with the latter: see BROUGHTON, MRR 2, 40, 42 & 48f. Eventually, his ambitions 
were cut short by his rather remarkable end as he died from a pestilence after recovering 
from being struck by lightning while lying ill in bed in his tent: Granius Licinianus 35.32-
42 (ed. Criniti, Leipzig 1981, 16f.) In all likelihood, Sulla’s frustrated attempt to carry a law 
ordering Strabo to abandon command of his army took place shortly after his colleague’s 
disastrous embassy. It also follows that C. Herennius’ tribunate of the plebs belongs to 88, 
and not 80 — contra SYME, 2016a, 60 & 71 («A fragment of Sallust’s Histories shows Sulla 
when consul proposing a law about the recall of Pompeius [Magnus] and BROUGHTON, MRR 
2, 80. 
49. HINARD, 1999, 427-432 ; comp. also 2011[2007] 69f. & 2008, 57f. KEAVENEY, 2005a, 
438f. argues that his analysis of Sulla’s activities as consul in 80 (p. 433-338) reinforces 
Hinard’s conclusions «and helped to vindicate its accuracy». Contra Hinard, however, 
KEAVENEY, 2005a, 438 cites Cic. Rosc. Am. 20, 127f. & 130f. to suggest that Sulla still held 
the dictatorship «some months after the consular elections» for 80 and eventually opts for «a 
date some time before the end of the year» — comp. also n. 81 infra.
55FREDERIK J. VERVAET
THE DATE, MODALITIES AND LEGACY OF SULLA’S ABDICATION OF HIS DICTATORSHIP:  
A STUDY IN SULLAN STATECRAFT
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / CC BY-NC-ND Stud. hist., H.ª antig., 36, 2018, pp. 31-82
and similarly Sulla became what he was because he held command 
of the armies so many years in succession, and later was appointed 
dictator, then consul. For it does not lie in human nature for a person 
— I speak not alone of the young but of the mature as well — after 
holding positions of authority for a long period to be willing to abide by 
ancestral custom.
Although Hinard cogently argues that Dio here drew from well-in-
formed sources and that his summary of Catulus’ speech is accurate50, he 
proposes that,
50. HINARD, 1999 428f. convincingly argues that Dio here reproduces the essence of 
an historical oration, probably, as MILLAR, 1964, 34 plausibly suggests, sourced from Sallust 
or Livy, and points to a number of other sources offering undeniable evidence of its 
historicity and the reliability of Dio’s summary: Cic. Man. 52 (summing up the arguments 
of Q. Hortensius Hortalus (cos. 69): Quid igitur ait Hortensius? Si uni omnia tribuenda 
sint, dignissimum esse Pompeium, sed ad unum tamen omnia deferri non oportere) & 59f. 
(summing up Catulus’ arguments, esp. 60: At enim ne quid noui fiat contra exempla atque 
instituta maiorum); Vell. Pat. 2.32; Val. Max. 8.15.9 and Plut. Pomp. 25.10. COUDRY, 2016 
convincingly argues that Dio considered the Gabinian Law as the turning point par excel-
lence on Rome’s wobbly road from democratic Republic to autocratic Empire and there-
fore integrated the speeches delivered by Pompeius, Gabinius and, especially, Catulus, 
whose address takes pride of place. Contra RODGERS, 2008, who argues that Catulus did 
not speak at all in 67, and that Dio created this speech by transferring to the debate of 67 
(bits and pieces of) the address given by Catulus in 66, adapted from what Cicero tells the 
people about the objections of Catulus and Hortensius in his Pro Lege Manilia and Pro 
Fonteio. HURLET, 2010, 114-117 more plausibly suggests that Dio reproduces the essence of 
Catulus’ discourse of 67, albeit in revised form. In my view, URSO, 2016, 28, n. 38 rightly 
terms Hurlet’s position «more balanced». COUDRY, 2016, 38, n. 17 also expresses doubt 
about Rodgers’ argument; «But in my opinion the ways Cicero mentions Catulus’ interven-
tions in his Pro lege Manilia are not sufficiently firm ground for this attractive hypothesis». 
Although BURDEN-STREVENS, 2016, 203, n. 44 also assumes that «the speech of Catulus is 
clearly Dio’s own composition» he nonetheless observes that «it is clear that the evidence 
of Cicero alone is not sufficient to assert with Saylor Rodgers 2008 that Catulus did not 
speak in 67 BCE». The evidence in Man. 52 & 60, where Cicero summarizes what (given 
what we know about Pompeius’ command under the lex Gabinia) must be words spoken 
by Hortensius and Catulus in 67, supports Coudry’s (op. cit., 37f.) suggestion that Dio in 
all likelihood also integrated bits and pieces of Hortensius’ address in his revised summary 
of the speech delivered by Catulus in 67 against the rogatio Gabinia: «This literary device, 
putting them in Catulus’ mouth, who is said to have had the highest authority among sena-
tors, allows Dio to enhance the argument and make it highly respectable and authorita-
tive». Two considerations further substantiate that Dio reworked historical speeches from 
67 BCE, either having consulted these documents or drawing on well-informed sources. 
First, the content of the speeches Pompeius, Gabinius and especially Catulus/Hortensius 
makes best sense in the context of vote of the Gabinian Law and what we know about its 
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 il est difficile de ne pas voir, dans le  qui sépare la dictature de 
l’exercice du consulat, l’indication d’une succession et, par conséquent, 
de comprendre autrement que comme l’affirmation selon laquelle Sylla 
n’a revêtu la charge de consul qu’après celle de dictateur.
First, Sulla’s presence in Catulus’ shortlist of ominous exempla sug-
gests that, in terms of public law, there was something unusual about 
his dictatorship and as well as his second consulate. Whilst Sulla’s dicta-
torship was in itself unique in terms of both empowerment and tenure, 
Catulus’ close association of his dictatorship and second consulship hints 
at further peculiarities, since there is nothing extraordinary about Sulla 
holding the consulship shortly after the dictatorship51. In a speech spe-
cifically attacking a fiercely contested bill providing for an overwhelm-
ing combination of powers, provinces and resources in the hands of a 
single proconsular commander52, however, Catulus’ words acquire their 
full meaning. Rather than merely reproducing the chronology and close 
succession of Sulla’s final magistracies cum imperio, Catulus was remind-
ing his audience here of the unsavory fact that Sulla, after many years as 
proconsul, had been invested first with the dictatorship and thereafter also 
with his second consulship, amounting to an unprecedented combination 
of the Republic’s highest magistracies cum imperio53. That Sulla continued 
to hold the vast power of his special dictatorship throughout his tenure as 
consul II explains Catulus’ stern warning that the continuous occupation 
of positions of great power corrupts absolutely. Therefore, his words as 
summarized in Dio 36.31.4 corroborate, rather than contradict, Appian’s 
unmistakable evidence in B.C. 1.10354.
provisions. Second, Catulus’ speech outlines complexities of the republican ius triumphi of 
which Dio possibly had an incomplete grasp: see VERVAET, 2014a, 79f. with n. 39; 216f. & 
239-252 (esp. n. 119 & 127).
51. The Middle Republic offers quite a few examples of senators holding the consul-
ship shortly before or after the dictatorship: see e.g. BROUGHTON, MRR, 1 120f.; 122f.; 128f.; 
132f.; 137; 147; 159; 171f.; 294f.; 315f.
52. See, e.g., Dio 36.34.4 & 35.1 & Cic. Man. 52 (quoted partially in n. 50 supra). 
53. Although T. Larcius and M. Livius Salinator reportedly combined the consulship 
and the dictatorship in 501 (or 498) and 207 successively (BROUGHTON, MRR 1, 9 & 12 and 
294f.), Sulla was the first Roman to hold both offices for an entire year.
54. Hinard’s interpretation of Dio 36.31.4 nonetheless found acceptance in e.g. 
LACHENAUD & COUDRY, 2014, 65, n. 135; BURDEN-STREVENS, 2016, 198, n. 23; and, esp., URSO, 
2016, 26 who asserts that «the temporal sequence is clear: it implies (against Appian) that 
Sulla was not dictator when he became consul in 80 BC». In n. 36, Urso further adds 
that «Dio denies explicitly this hypothesis [i.e., that Sulla was the first Roman ever to 
combine both dictatorship and consulship for an entire year] explicitly at 43.21.25: Caesar 
was the first to be appointed dictator ‘for an entire year’ (cf. n. 41 below)» — in n. 41, Urso 
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Hinard’s assertion that Appian (loc. cit.) admits «que c’est l’exemple 
impérial qui l’amène à ces conclusions» fails to convince55. Beside the fact 
that it strains belief that Appian (or, for that matter, his sources) simply ‘in-
vented’ the tradition that Sulla combined his plenipotentiary dictatorship 
with the consulship throughout 80 BCE, it is precisely this remarkable 
explains that «it is significant that, describing the dictatorship bestowed on Caesar in 48 BC 
after Pharsalus [sic], Dio stresses that two traditional rules were broken on that occasion: 
Caesar was appointed dictator «not for six months, but for an entire year» (42.20.3: 
), «although he was outside of Italy» (42.21.1: 
), «for a year, contrary to all precedent’ (42.21.2: 
). These were indeed the two rules mentioned in Catulus’s speech». To this I 
should add Plut. Caes. 51.1, where we are told that Caesar returned to Rome «at the close 
of the year for which he had a second time been chosen dictator, though that office 
had never before been for a whole year» — 
. However, in 
my view, Urso (and others) here miss(es) a key point. Late in 48, Caesar indeed was the 
first Roman ever to be appointed to the dictatura in annum by virtue of the statute law 
that established his dictatorship, in sharp contrast to Sulla, who regardless of his unpre-
cedented tenure was legally appointed ad tempus incertum, like all dictators before him. 
Unlike Sulla, Caesar thus converted the dictatura into an annual magistracy, a magistracy 
ad tempus certum, at least until he abandoned this arrangement for that of the dictatura 
perpetuo in February 44 BCE. Caesar’s second through fourth dictatorships therefore re-
present the sharpest possible break from tradition and constitute a watershed on the road 
to monarchy in terms of both nature (ad tempus certum) and finality (no longer bound 
to a specific causa). After Pharsalia and especially Thapsus, a sharply modified dictatura 
was Caesar’s vehicle of choice to establish a lasting autocracy, as opposed to Sulla, who 
saw his unprecedented dictatorship as a draconian if temporary means to a reactionary 
purpose: see VERVAET, 2004 and 2014a, 223-239. In light of these considerations, Dio’s 
decision to single out Caesar’s dictatorship in Zon. 7.13.4 (where it is again recorded that 
the (traditional) «office of dictator extended for a period of not more than six months» — 
) as the real turning point, 
as opposed to for example Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who in 5.77.4 singles out Sulla’s 
dictatorship as the moment the Romans for the first time understood that the dictatorship 
is a tyranny, becomes perfectly understandable. Although Urso conclusively demonstra-
tes that, at least in Dio’s eyes, Caesar and not Sulla was to blame for establishing lasting 
 at Rome, however cruel the latter’s methods, his narrative should not and cannot 
be used as evidence that Sulla did not continue his dictatorship beyond the comminatory 
tempus imposed on the traditional dictatura r.g.c. In my view, there consequently also is 
no inherent contradiction between the passages in Dio quoted by Urso on pp. 23f. (viz. 
41.11.2 & 44.28.1, «in which the term  is actually associated to Sulla») and those 
on pp. 25-29: Sulla’s dictatorship, represented by Dio as a ‘republican dictatorship’ (URSO, 
op. cit., 31f.), too, amounted to , but then one created as a temporary instrument 
towards a ‘republican’ purpose. For another example of that tradition that did not conceive 
of Sulla’s dictatorship as the starting point of autocracy in Rome, see Quint. Inst. 5.10.71f.: 
‘non dominationis causa Sullam arma sumpisse, argumentum est dictatura deposita’.
55. HINARD, 1999, 428. 
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novelty that prompts Appian’s comment that this may well have inspired 
early imperial practice56. Hinard subsequently tries to develop the hypoth-
esis that Sulla abdicated his dictatorship before the comitia consularia of 
July 81. According to Hinard, Sulla was keen to be seen as respectful 
of republican constitutional custom («la légalité républicaine») and there-
fore refused to preside over his own election to the consulship of 80 in the 
capacity of dictator, which necessitated an abdication before the start of 
the electoral campaign57. That he may well have allowed the consuls 
of 81 to preside over the electoral comitia for 80, in keeping with his 
edict restoring political normality (supra), need not preclude his continu-
ation as dictator58. Likewise, he could have perfectly presided over the 
consular elections for 79 as consul II while holding on to his dictatura59. 
Hinard next suggests that Sulla laid down his office on the Kalends of 
June, 81, «date que Sulla lui-même avait fixée, dans la loi de proscription, 
comme limite au-delà de laquelle il ne serait plus possible de procéder à 
la vente des biens de proscrits»60, asserting that Sulla put a six-month limit 
to this procedure because «il désirait la faire coïncider avec le terme de sa 
56. Hinard’s use of Appian is selective. One the one hand, he in 2008, 43 (comp. 
also 2011[2007], 64) correctly insists that Appian in B.C. 1.96f. unequivocally records that 
the consul Cn. Papirius Carbo was executed in Sicily by Cn. Pompeius before Sulla’s ap-
pointment to the dictatorship by the interrex L. Valerius Flaccus (a chronology confirmed 
by Livy Per. 89 and Orosius 5.21.11f., whose representation suggests that Sulla took the 
dictatorship immediately upon receiving word of Carbo’s demise), contra VERVAET, 2004, 
38, n. 2, where Carbo’s demise is groundlessly dated to after Sulla’s nomination. On the 
other hand, he is quick to dismiss (2008, 56) Appian’s equally precise evidence that Sulla 
combined dictatorship and consulship throughout 80 BCE. That Appian for example re-
counts in B.C. 1.98 that he «came across a document which relates that Sulla was styled 
Epaphroditus by decree of the Senate» suggests he took considerable care in studying the 
finer detail of Sulla’s career during and after the civil war, no doubt because he was keenly 
aware of the significance of this episode in Roman history. Both Hinard and Keaveney 
moreover seem to ignore the fact that it was perfectly possible to combine two non-
annual magistracies or a non-annual one with an annual one, curule or plebeian, whereas 
the combination of two annual (curule or plebeian) magistracies was inadmissible: see 
MOMMSEN, 18873, 1, 513-517 and 2, 146 (dictator), 174 (magister equitum) & 340 (censores); 
and VERVAET, 2007, 230-231 (with regard to the magisterium equitum). Consequently, it was 
perfectly possible to exercise authority by virtue of one or either offices.
57. HINARD, 1999, 429f. 
58. KEAVENEY, 2005a, 428 likewise suggests that one of the consuls presided over the 
electoral comitia of 81. 
59. Cf. also the final paragraph with n. 104 infra.
60. As attested in Rosc. Am. 128: Opinor enim esse in lege, quam ad diem proscriptions 
uenditionesque fiant, nimium Kalendas Iunias — «Now I believe tht the latest date on 
which proscriptions and sales may take place is stated in the law — namely, the first of 
June». See also §130 for a mention of the dies legis.
59FREDERIK J. VERVAET
THE DATE, MODALITIES AND LEGACY OF SULLA’S ABDICATION OF HIS DICTATORSHIP:  
A STUDY IN SULLAN STATECRAFT
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / CC BY-NC-ND Stud. hist., H.ª antig., 36, 2018, pp. 31-82
magistrature, dont la tradition voulait, en effet, qu’elle ne dure pas plus 
de six mois»61. Apart from ignoring all the above-mentioned evidence sug-
gesting that Sulla was still dictator when Cicero spoke in defense of Sex. 
Roscius, Hinard fails to consider that Sulla’s dictatura legibus scribundis et 
rei publicae constituendae was vastly different from the traditional dictat-
ura rei gerundae caussa in terms of both empowerment and intent, and 
that the dictatorship r.g.c.’s six-month tempus was a comminatory maxi-
mum term rather than a tempus certum. Furthermore, had Sulla really had 
the intention to abdicate his dictatorship after six months when he as pro-
consul forced its creation late in 82, bent on respecting the constitutional 
conventions of the Middle Republic, such would have resonated in the 
extant sources. 
Hinard also believes that Catulus’ words in Dio 36.34.1f. further con-
firm this hypothesis. After first arguing that it was much preferable for the 
people to rely on the traditional annual magistracies (and their properly 
prorogued promagisterial counterparts) rather than investing a private citi-
zen with some novel extraordinary command, Catulus goes on to suggest 
the following alternative, well worth quoting in full given its importance 
to this discussion: 
61. HINARD, 1999, 430. Regardless of his preference for Appian’s chronology, WOSNIK, 
1963, 106f. had already argued that the epigraphical record suggests that Sulla’s tenure did 
not exceed the traditional term of six months, and that his dictatorship «könnte etwa von 
Dezember 82 bis Juni des folgenden Jahres gedauert haben». Though he closely follows 
the arguments of BADIAN (esp. 1962a, 231, n. 117 & 1970, 12f.) and HINARD, 1999, THEIN, 
2002, 355-360 eventually suggests that Sulla abdicated sometime in the first two weeks of 
July 81, shortly before the consular elections of mid-July and «some seven months after the 
assumption of the dictatorship, perhaps during or soon after the Ludi Apollinares».
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Yet if there should be any necessity of choosing another in addition 
to the annual magistrates, there is for this, too, an ancient precedent — I 
refer to the dictator. However, because this magistrate held such power, 
our fathers did not appoint one on all occasions nor for a longer period 
than six months. Accordingly, if you require such an official, you may, 
without either transgressing the laws or forming plans in disregard of the 
common welfare, elect Pompeius himself or anyone else as dictator — 
on condition that he shall not hold office longer than the appointed time 
nor outside of Italy. For surely you are not unaware that this second 
limitation, too, was scrupulously observed by our forefathers, and no 
instance can be found of a dictator chosen for another country, except 
one who was sent to Sicily, and who, moreover, accomplished nothing. 
But if Italy requires no such person, and you would no longer tolerate, 
I will not say the functions of the dictator, but even the name, as is clear 
from your anger at Sulla, how could it be right for a new position of 
command to be created, and that, too, for three years and embracing 
practically all interests both in Italy and outside?
According to Hinard, «il faillait bien que le discours de Catullus fût 
credible et il ne pouvait l’être si la dictature de Sylla avait duré plus de 
six mois»62. It is, however, clear from both the context and Catulus’ word-
ing (as summarized by Dio) that the senior consular in this particular in-
stance speaks of the dictatorship of the ancestral Republic as it fell into 
abeyance after 202 BCE63. The mention of the dictatorship of A. Atilius 
Calatinus (cos. 258, 254, pr. 257), the first dictator to lead an army outside 
of Italy, confirms this reading64. This quite positive mention of the tradi-
tional dictatura as an alternative preferable over the position envisaged 
by the rogatio Gabinia is distinct from Catulus’ subsequent, plainly nega-
tive, allusion to the fact that Sulla’s novel dictatorship, which had occurred 
only a little over a decade ago, had rendered the very notion of this office 
wholly intolerable. The emphatic mention of the two foremost checks on 
the traditional dictatorship confirms this reading: only to that sort of dicta-
torship could Pompeius or some other suitable person be appointed in 67, 
and not to the reviled plenipotentiary office held by Sulla65. A parallel can, 
62. HINARD, 1999, 430f.
63. Compare THEIN, 2002, 359: «nor is it clear whether Catulus will have included Sulla 
among the maiores».
64. See BROUGTON, MRR 1, 215.
65. Like Hinard before him, URSO, 2016, 26-28 ignores this key nuance in Catulus’ 
address. In n. 38 of p. 28, Urso argues that «in any case, I cannot see why Dio mentioned 
Calatinus’ precedent (far from familiar to Catulus’ contemporaries and Dio’s readers), 
omitting that of Sulla (perfectly known by all of them), if he thought that Sulla had been 
dictator ‘against the rules’». Since Dio first talks about the dictatorship of the Middle 
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furthermore, be found in John the Lydian’s treatise On the Magistracies of 
the Roman State, 36-38, where he discusses ‘the so-called dictatura’. After 
indicating (in 36, ed. Bandy p. 54 ll. 13f.) that the dictator’s «sovereign 
power was limited to only six months» (
), he further in his description of the republican (i.e., pre-
Sullan) magistracy (37, ed. Bandy p. 56, ll. 15-17) emphatically calls to 
mind again that, 
None of the dictators, however, retained the sovereignty of sole 
rule more than six months but even much less, even for only one day.
After ending his discussion of a selection of republican dictators with 
a brief if somewhat muddled account of alleged irregularities in the ap-
pointments of the Second Punic War (38, ed. Bandy p. 60, ll. 8-13), his 
narrative entirely ignores Sulla and jumps straight to Caesar, who is con-
spicuously branded a monarch rather than a dictator (38, ed. Bandy, loc. 
cit., ll. 13-17):
Roman history mentions these, and only these, dictatores, or 
‘interim kings’. After them, however, Gaius Iulius Caesar, when he had 
undertaken against the Senate and Pompeius a war which was disastrous 
to the Republic, proclaimed himself sole ruler, having employed Lepidus 
as magister equitum.
Clearly, John the Lydian conceived of Sulla’s tyrannical and unusually 
long dictatura legibus scribundis et rei publicae constituendae as a wholly 
irregular abomination, a contradiction in terms, unsuitable for mention in 
his survey of the republican dictatorship66.
Republic before briefly alluding to the more recent example of Sulla, this makes perfect 
sense. In n. 39 of p. 28, Urso moreover avers that Sulla’s dictatorship was ‘not in itself 
extraordinary’, a curious claim flying into the face of the combined extant evidence (see 
VERVAET, 2004).
66. In chapter 6 of his treatise On the Magistracies of Roman State, he casts both Sulla 
and Marius as domini and tyrants: «And it is absolutely clear that it was customary for 
the Romans to call tyrannical rulers domini, as, for instance, Sulla and Marius ,and to call 
tyranny dominatio» —  dominos 
(ed. Bandy p. 17, ll. 6-8). 
That he held Sulla in low esteem is also clear from chapter 1 of his treatise On Caesar 
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Hinard concedes that Orosius’ statement in 5.22.1 (supra) might pose 
a problem for his hypothesis but explains it away with the argument that 
«si la dictature s’est bien terminée début juin, Sylla revêtit la toga candida, 
ce qui peut passer pour un statut différent de celui de priuatus; et la 
même remarque vaut pour le statut de consul designatus qui fut le sien 
jusqu’au début de l’année 80». Although magistrates-elect did enjoy certain 
privileges, like the potestas contionandi, even a consul designatus legally 
still remained a private citizen until he assumed the fasces on the first of 
January67. Hinard finally argues that had Sulla wanted to retain imperium 
to protect himself against his enemies, he would have preferred a second 
dictatorship over a second consulship68. It was precisely in order to ensure 
a flawless and undisturbed return to political normality that he opted for 
continuatio as dictator throughout his tenure as consul II. It was not be-
fore the outset of 79 that he would finally abdicate, after holding the dicta-
torship for the wholly unprecedented period of over two calendar years69. 
In more recent discussions of these issues, Hinard also quotes Suet. 
Diu. Iul. 77 as further evidence that Sulla strictly respected the institutional 
rules governing the dictatorship and therefore must not have exceeded its 
traditional six-month term70:
Nec minoris inpotentiae uoces propalam edebat, ut Titus Ampius 
scribit: nihil esse rem publicam, appellationem modo sine corpore et 
specie. Sullam nescisse litteras, qui dictaturam deposuerit. 
and Caesar’s Insignia (ed. Bandy p. 83), where both Marius and Sulla are repeatedly 
branded tyrants (ll. 6f. & 22) and their achievements cast in a particularly negative light 
— according to John the Lydian, Sulla got «nothing else but the title of Felix» from his civil 
war victory (ed. Bandy, loc. cit., ll. 14f.).
67. On the (rarely exercised) potestas contionandi of magistrates-elect, see PINA POLO, 
2016b. 
68. HINARD, 1999, 431.
69. In this respect, it is important to remember that the fires of the civil war between 
Sulla and his opponents had not yet been completely extinguished in 80 and that Sulla 
had also decided to settle the veterans of no less than twenty-three legions across Italy (as 
attested in App. B.C. 1.100). Although THEIN, 2010 argues against the so-called ‘garrison 
theory’, SANTANGELO, 2007, 148-157 shows that the safely attested settlements were mostly 
concentrated in Campania and in Etruria, «and the impression that Sulla’s efforts were pur-
posefully focused on these very areas is no doubt correct». That Sulla’s dominatio roughly 
lasted as long as that of L. Cornelius Cinna may perhaps be inferred from Tac. Ann. 1.1: 
non Cinnae, non Sullae longa dominatio. Cinna held four successive consulships from 87 
to 84 but it was really the death of C. Marius on 13 January 86 that gave him free rein until 
he was killed by mutinous troops at Ancona early in 84: BROUGHTON, MRR 2, 53 & 60.
70. HINARD, 2011[2007] 70 & 2008, 58.
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No less arrogant were his public utterances, which Titus Ampius 
records: that the state was nothing, a mere name without body or form; 
that Sulla was ignorant to lay down his dictatorship.
First, this passage in Suetonius is hardly useful in terms of determin-
ing the date of Sulla’s abdication. Second, Hinard ignores that Sulla’s spe-
cial dictatorship was very different from the dictatura rei gerundae caussa 
of old71. As for the meaning of Caesar’s notorious words, Gelzer’s argu-
ment is vastly preferable: «nach dem Zusammenhang bei Sueton gehört er 
in Caesars letzte Zeit und betrifft die Frage, ob die alte res publica noch 
lebensfähig sei. Caesar nennt Sulla einen Analphabeten, weil er an die res 
publica glaubte, das is die Pointe»72. Much in the same vein, Syme sug-
gests that «if the nobiles failed to maintain the system, it was their fault, 
not his. Caesar’s comment can be understood — Sulla believed in the res 
publica. Or at least, he behaved as though he did»73. Regardless of the 
question whether Caesar was right or wrong to believe that the Republic 
was irretrievably lost by the time of Sulla’s dictatorship, his retrospective 
comment is unfair to the extent that Sulla’s intentions were very different 
from his, and Sulla had to abdicate for his attempt at rebuilding the ances-
tral polity to work, despite the inevitable and considerable risks of doing 
so and good evidence of Sulla being fully aware of these.
What of Keaveney’s claim that Sulla crushed the last remnants of the 
Italian opposition in 80 as consul, not as dictator? 
In that year there were still Italian towns to be reduced. Volaterrae 
it would seem did not yield until 79 and before that the government 
troops had mutinied and killed their commander Carbo. Elsewhere the 
Sullani were more successful. Nola definitely fell to them and possibly 
also Aesernia. On the basis of the Livian epitomator and Sall. Hist. 
1.46M/McG. it could be conjectured that Sulla himself took Nola while 
Catiline dealt with Aesernia. But whether or not this reconstruction is 
accepted the fact remains that Catiline is definitely styled legatus in the 
Sulla fragment and thus can surely only be the legate of the consul Sulla 
in 80. It was in that office, not a dictatorship, that Sulla dealt with Italian 
resistance in 8074.
71. Compare also CORNELL, 2015, 120: «Sulla revived what had previously been a 
relatively innocuous institution, and turned it into a tyranny by fundamentally changing its 
character and purpose».
72. GELZER, 1932, 606.
73. SYME, 2016a, 77.
74. KEAVENEY, 2005a, 437f.
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In Rosc. Am. 128 and 20, we learn that Sex. Roscius the Elder was 
murdered «some months» after the Kalends of June 81 (aliquot post men-
ses: 128), and that news of the events was reported to Chrysogonus in 
Sulla’s camp at Volaterrae four days days after the incident (quadriduo, 
quo haec gesta sunt, res ad Chrysogonum in castra L. Sulla Volaterras de-
fertur: 20). In §91 of the same speech, Cicero furthermore terms Sulla 
imperator, i.e., commander-in-chief, at the time of these events, and sug-
gests that he was much preoccupied with the ongoing hostilities. All of 
this shows that Sulla continued to hold the overall command of opera-
tions against Volaterrae well after 1 June 81 and that he was probably 
personally overseeing the war effort there when Chrysogonus learned of 
Sex. Roscius’ demise75. Thanks to Granius Licinianus (36.8f. ed. Criniti, 
Leipzig 1981, 25) and Valerius Maximus (9.7 mil. Rom. 3), we also know 
that he eventually left the protracted siege of Volaterrae to the praetorius 
C. Papirius Carbo (perhaps as legatus pro praetore), who was stoned to 
death by mutinous troops shortly before the city surrendered. Although 
Livy (Per. 89) claims that Sulla received the surrender of the city after first 
capturing Aesernia, Granius Licinianus (loc. cit.) records that the town sur-
rendered only in 7976, when the proscribed were expelled and killed by 
cavalry sent by the consuls P. Servilius and Ap. Claudius. Still according to 
the same source, Nola had already surrendered under similar conditions 
the year before77. Strabo, for his part, merely recounts in 5.26.6 that the 
siege of Volaterrae lasted two years and that the expulsion of the pro-
scribed by the Volaterrans was part of the articles of truce78. Despite his 
intent to govern the Republic in 80 as consul, it is quite likely that Sulla 
continued to hold the high command in these mop-up operations in his 
capacity as dictator: this fighting was after all the tail end of the major 
conflagration that had resulted in its creation, and the lasting resolution 
of which represented its very causa79. It is, therefore, also not implausible 
75. This evidence alone explodes Hinard’s rather dogmatic thesis of an abdication 
on the first of June 81. In Rosc. Am. 127, Cicero asserts that Chrysogonus prevented Sulla 
being informed about these matters by the envoys from Ameria. 
76. Correctly so DART, 2014, 208.
77. The sequence and representation of events in Livy Per. 89, too, suggests that Nola 
surrendered first, followed by the capture (or surrender) of Aesernia and subsequently that 
of Volaterrae. 
78. Contra ECKERT, 2016, 190 n. 101, who believes the town surrendered in 80 and 
sees this as further evidence that Sulla must have abdicated in that year, since «damit war 
der militärische Widerstand gegen Sulla auf italischem Boden zu einem Ende gekommen».
79. Regardless of the fact that Volaterrae surrendered only in 79 and the debatable 
question whether or not Sulla conducted the actual ductus in some of the fighting of 
80, the representation in Per. 89 unequivocally suggests that all operations against the 
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that the death of Carbo at the hands of his mutinous troops occurred at 
some point early in 79, shortly after news broke that Sulla had at long last 
abandoned his dreaded dictatorship80. At all events, the prolongation of 
hostilities in Italy into 80 would have given Sulla yet another strong ra-
tionale to continue his dictatorship while he held his second consulship. 
At any rate, the above empirical reconstruction of events has the dis-
tinct advantage of reconciling, and accounting for, all extant evidence, 
without the need to ignore, discredit or explain away certain sources81. 
Since Quintilian attests (in Inst. 3.8.53) that posterity’s preoccupation with 
Sulla’s abdication was such that his abdication speech was a popular 
choice for practice compositions in the schools of rhetoric, featuring along-
side Priam’s words to Achilles, its date would have been common knowl-
edge amongst Rome’s educated elites. Therefore, it would be unwise and, 
for that matter, methodologically flawed, to dismiss all the evidence point-
ing to an abdication early in 79 as simply incorrect. Furthermore, the tradi-
tion of Caesar’s alleged criticism that Sulla was ignorant to lay down his 
dictatorship makes more sense if he did so only after an unprecedented 
continuation: after retaining his legally unfettered office for such a long 
time, why then überhaupt abdicate?82.
3. CONCLUSIONS
The above analysis suggests that, rather than abdicating abruptly im-
mediately after pushing through the bulk of his legislation in the first half 
remnants of Sulla’s Italian enemies took place under his imperium auspiciumque. For the 
important distinction between ductu and imperio auspicioque, see VERVAET, 2014a, 17-28. 
In my view, Sulla mostly would have left the actual fighting to his legati.
80. Contra Broughton in MRR 2, 81, where Carbo’s death is dated to 80. I do, howe-
ver, accept Broughton’s (op. cit., 76) tentative dating of his praetorship to 81: «As he sup-
ported Sulla he could hardly have attained the office before 81».
81. It are the seeming inconsistencies that eventually compel KEAVENEY, 2005a to en-
dorse the view that Sulla abdicated some time well before the end of 81: «In this paper 
I examined the evidence of the three main sources, Orosius, Plutarch and Appian. I dis-
covered that they broadly agreed in their belief that Sulla continued to hold the dictator- 
ship during 80. I then turned to our sources for that year and could find only a consulship with 
no mention of a dictatorship. I concluded that the dictatorship must have been given up some- 
time in 81. Our contemporary informant Cicero seems to suggest that he was still holding 
it fairly late in the year but we should budget for time to make a grand and meaningful ge-
sture of renunciation» (quoted from p. 439; compare, however, with KEAVENEY, 2005b, 139, 
1982, 164, and 1980, 157-159, where Sulla’s abdication is dated towards the end of 81).
82. Suet. Diu. Iul. 77, quoted supra.
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of 81, Sulla instead chose to relax his dictatorial regime gradually. In other 
words, rather than suddenly releasing his iron grip on Roman political 
life, he preferred to work towards full normalization through a carefully 
orchestrated process and abdicated only when he felt he could do so in 
optimum circumstances. Plutarch indicates in Sull. 6.8 that Sulla had the 
habit of relaxing his severity out of calculated regard for his interests. 
Following his highly controversial proscription and the forceful enactment 
of an impressive series of often harsh laws in 82 and 81, he indeed had 
every interest in slackening the reins in order to calm the waters and pave 
the way for his eventual abdication. 
As the vehicle used to impose his draconic measures, Sulla’s abso-
lute dictatorship was inextricably bound with one of the ghastliest, most 
unsavoury episodes in the history of the Roman Republic. Therefore, he 
wisely decided on a phased return to normality, gradually reviving the 
traditional supremacy of the consuls in the restored Republic. In 81, per-
haps indeed on or around the Kalends of June, he first invited the consuls 
and the other magistrates of that year to resume their traditional roles in 
state matters, albeit under his close watch. Next he stood for the consul-
ship himself and ran the Republic in 80 as consul, with Metellus Pius as 
his colleague. As suggested by the extant epigraphical evidence, Sulla saw 
to it that he was merely styled consul II in all public documents produced 
that year by the respective political bodies and authorities in Rome. At the 
latest during his second consulship, he decided to end his career, which 
had been predominantly military and stained by civil war, civilly and in 
a civilian capacity. He therefore insisted on spending his entire second 
tenure as consul in Italy and Rome, where he also intended to stage the 
theatrical abdication of his dictatorship in the Forum at the outset of 
the next year. The evidence further suggests that Sulla closely observed the 
consular elections for 78 as a private citizen, and possibly even canvassed 
on behalf of certain candidates in the Forum. Seen in this light, his seem-
ingly odd refusal to assume command of Gallia Cisalpina, possibly as-
signed sine sorte in 80 as the situation in Hispania worsened, made perfect 
sense83.
83. Assigned lege Sempronia before the consular elections of 81: VERVAET, 2004, 49 & 
KEAVENEY, 2005a, 436; sine sorte: RAFFERTY, 2017, 156, where it is argued that the wording 
in App. B.C. 1.97 suggests that the decision to send Sulla’s colleague Metellus Pius to 
Hispania Ulterior was made late and in response to Sertorius’ unexpected success. Thanks 
to Cic. Planc. 69, we do know that Metellus Pius was still in Rome for the praetorian 
elections of 80. Appian (loc. cit.) makes Sulla responsible for the decision to send Metellus 
to Hispania and mistakenly dates this decision before his appointment to the dictatorship. 
Nonetheless, Appian’s representation, as well as the wording in Granius Licinianus 36.11f. 
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Appian’s claim in BC 1.103 that Sulla undertook a second consulship in 
80 «in order to preserve the pretence and form of republican government» 
is thus to be taken at face value84. In order to run for one of the consul-
ships of 80, Sulla probably duly petitioned the Senate for dispensation from 
one of his very own laws, namely the Cornelian Law mandating an inter-
val of ten years between successive consulships85. This is indicative of just 
how important the matter was to Sulla. His second consulship, exercised 
in genuine collegiality with Metellus Pius, was not only intended as the 
cherry on the cake of his work as a statesman, as recognition and reward, 
but also as a powerful assurance of the reinstatement of the traditional Res 
Publica. Since Sulla combined the consulship of 80 with his now more or 
less dormant dictatorship, he nonetheless remained in the best possible po-
sition to ensure that his coveted and symbolically most important second 
consulship would not be marked by the violent upheavals and civil war 
that had marred his first consulship86. His attested anxiety that a ranking 
(ed. Criniti, Leipzich 1981, 25: Data erat et Sullae prou[inci]a Gallia Cisalpi[na], indeed hint 
at a nominatim appointment in 80 following Sertorius’ victorious return to Hispania in that 
year (BROUGHTON, MRR 2, 77 & 81). As for the Senate’s rationale for assigning Cisalpine 
Gaul as prouincia consularis: the province bordered strategically on northern Italy (comp. 
BADIAN, 1962a, 23, 2 n. 123: «Sulla himself seems to have considered taking the Cisalpina 
as a province in 79, no doubt in order to have an army on the borders of Italy») and had 
been a stronghold of anti-Sullan forces in the civil war (App. B.C. 1.86; Cic. Verr. 2.1.34; 
comp. BADIAN, 1966, 910). If the Senate really assigned consular provinces lege Sempronia 
before the consular elections of 81, the consuls of 80 were probably jointly entrusted with 
Italia because of protracted hostilities there (cf. supra). However, as the Senate could not 
foresee that Sulla would abdicate only as late as in January 79, this hypothesis does not 
preclude that Sulla in 80 oversaw all relevant civil matters in Rome and Italy as consul 
while retaining the high command in the military operations against the last bulwarks of 
Italian opposition in his capacity of dictator. Syme 2016a, 69f. oddly suggests that «Granius 
was referring to the allocation of provinces before the consular elections in 79 BC», and 
that «the Cisalpina seems to have been Lepidus’ province». 
84. Contra WOSNIK, 1963, 122f., who calls this representation into question and 
remains at a loss as to why the title of dictator is absent from the extant epigraphical 
official records of 80.
85. For Sulla’s law forbidding any man to hold the same office a second time before 
ten years had lapsed, see App. B.C. 1.100 and KUNKEL & WITTMANN, 1995, 46f. & 707f. By 
virtue of his powers under the Valerian Law, Sulla could easily have dispensated himself 
by means of an edict, but it is far more likely he made a polite request of the Senate so as 
to acknowledge their traditional authority in this sphere.
86. As SUMI, 2002, 428-431 argues, «the three personal virtues which formed the buil-
ding blocks of Sulla’s public image — felicitas, salus and concordia — also comprised 
the iconography of pax», probably one of the foremost symbols of his regime. At any 
rate, Sulla’s anxiousness to avoid renewed civil strife is also evident from his reluctant 
decision to give way to Pompeius’ brazen petition for a full public triumph in March 81: 
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noble like Metellus might well cause him some trouble during his tenure as 
consul II gave him all the more reason not to lay down his dictatorship be-
fore the successful and peaceful conclusion of his second consulship87. The 
insubordinate conduct of Cn. Pompeius, Q. Lucretius Ofella and Aemilius 
Lepidus in 81 and 79/78 demonstrates that Sulla had good reason to pro-
ceed with caution88. His theatrical ‘mission accomplished’ abdication at the 
outset of 79, then, was intended as the grand finale of his reactionary resto-
ration of the ancestral Republic89. In light of these considerations, it should 
not surprise that he took ample time to restore law and order in Rome and 
across Italy and the provinces90. 
see VERVAET, 2014b, 132-136 as well as the discussion in the Postscript. For a conclusive 
argument that Pompeius’ first equestrian triumph took place on 12 March 81, see BADIAN, 
1955; comp. already LANZANI, 1933.
87. In light of the above, Cicero’s Pro Roscio Amerino could be seen as a genuine test 
of Sulla’s sincerity to administer the Republic in 80 as consul, and not as dictator. Humbert 
1925, 100 speculates that Rosc. Am. 21 suggests that «il est même très vraisemblable 
que Cicéron a parlé avec l’assentiment du redoutable dictateur»: Haec omnia, iudices, 
imprudente L. Sulla facta esse certo scio — «I am convinced, gentlemen, that all this took 
place without Sulla’s knowledge». Whilst it is impossible to answer this question, I do not 
share Humbert’s optimism (102f.) that Sulla approved of Cicero’s defense and that the 
latter really departed for Greece for the sake of convalescing — comp. also Syme 2016b, 
where it is argued that Cicero’s Pro Roscio is not to be read as an attack on Sulla’s regime 
but as an instance of ‘the gradual return of settled government’. Humbert (loc. cit.) also 
suggests that, for political reasons, Cicero may have ramped up the anti-Sullan sentiment in 
the final edition of his speech after the death of Sulla. For a more meticulous and extensive 
discussion the Pro Roscio in its wider political context, see DIEHL, 1988, 43-66. At all events, 
Roscius’ eventual acquittal should also be explained in terms of his connections: the Roscii 
were in the clientela of the Metelli and other aristocratic houses (Rosc. Am. 15); Roscius 
had taken refuge in the house of Caecilia Metella (Rosc. Am. 27); and Cicero enjoyed the 
support in court of a group of young nobiles (Rosc. Am. 1, 77 & 149).
88. On Pompeius’ defiant insubordination of the early months of 81, see VERVAET, 
2014b, 132-136 (compare also supra n. 86 and the Postscript); on the insubordination and 
public execution of Lucretius Ofella in the run-up to the consular elections of 81, see the 
Postscript; on the consulship and rebellion M. Aemilius Lepidus in 78/77, see now Arena 
2011 and Burton 2014. 
89. SUMI, 2002, 432 discerningly terms the abdication in contione the «last Sullan spec-
tacle». For Sulla’s lifelong love of actors, singers, dancers and musicians, see, e.g. Plut. Sull. 
2.2-4 & 33.2.
90. This analysis thus substantiates and qualifies the relevant views of Mommsen and 
Syme. Mommsen 19039, 366f. even considers «die Zurückführung der Ausnahmezustände 
in die neualten gesetzlichen Bahnen» to have been Sulla’s most difficult task and rightly 
argues that he «dieses letzte Ziel nie aus den Augen verloren hatte», and that Sulla’s 
decision to stand for the consulship of 80 has to be seen against this background. He is, 
however, wrong to believe that it was only in 80, and not in 81, that Sulla allowed the 
traditional public bodies to resume their normal operations: despite the fact that Sulla 
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The confusion about the precise duration of Sulla’s dictatorship can 
probably also be explained in that Sulla’s chronologically organized me-
moirs, with its 22 books the longest known autobiography in Latin, did 
not leave much space to deal with his dictatorship. We know that the criti-
cal battle of the Colline Gate of 1 November 82 featured in Book 21, and, 
as Smith discerningly observes, “there remained the great engagement at 
Praeneste and the victories of Sulla’s lieutenants at Clusium, Faventia and 
Fidentia to relate […] In other words, whether intentionally or not, a mat-
ter we will come to discuss, Sulla did not leave a justification for his politi-
cal actions during his dictatorship at Rome in his autobiography»91. 
4. EPILOGUE: SULLA’S MODUS ABDICANDI AND ITS POLITICAL LEGACY IN THE 
TRIUMVIRAL ERA.
The above analysis also shines a new light on what would transpire 
some fifty years later, under the aegis of Imperator Caesar Divi filius, 
organized the elections of consuls for 81 «blieb die Macht noch ausschließlich bei dem 
Regenten und ward die Wahl auf sekundäre Persönlichkeiten geleitet. Aber im Jahre 
darauf (674 80) setzte Sulla die ordentliche Verfassung wieder vollständig in Wirksamkeit 
und verwaltete als Konsul in Gemeinschaft mit seinem Waffengenossen Quintus Metellus 
den Staat, während er die Regentschaft zwar noch beibehielt, aber vorläufig ruhen ließ». 
In 2016a, 62, Syme likewise suggests that «in 80 BC Sulla had been consul as well as 
dictator, perhaps more the one than the other. Tenure of the magistracy enabled him 
to modify the character of his regiment, to glide with discretion from despotism into 
legality, and to safeguard the delicate transition». Compare also op. cit. p. 78 («By his 
tenure of the consulate in 80 BC the dictator inaugurated the rule of law and prepared 
the way to glide out gracefully») and SYME, 1964, 180 («It will be plausible to assume 
that Sulla, consul in 80 with Metellus Pius and gliding gently towards legality and the 
Republic, ceased to be dictator when he laid down the consulship on the last day of 
December»). 
91. SMITH, 2009, 68 (with n. 22 of p. 81). Thanks to Suet. Gramm. 12, we also know 
that on Sulla’s death, Book 22 was left incomplete but finished by the freedman Epidacus. 
Smith (p. 73f., comp. 78) plausibly suggests that Roman «autobiographies sow little politi-
cal interest […] It seems that the genre may have focused very strongly on the develop-
ment of a career up to and including a triumph; that is to say that it was constructed along 
the principles of an elogium and therefore beyond the culminating moment of the triumph 
there was little to add, and it is notable that Rich here argues similarly for Augustus’ au-
tobiography. This would give an additional reason for the conclusion of Sulla’s work, 
whose avoidance of the political aspects of the dictatorship may not merely have been the 
product of shortness of time, but the deliberate, and possibly welcome, constraint of the 
form». Augustus, too, indeed completed his autobiography in the mid 20s BCE, before he 
received plainly unrepublican powers in 23, 22 and 19 BCE (on these, VERVAET, 2014a, 258-
275; on the ending of Augustus’ biography, see RICH, 2009).
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Caesar’s adoptive son and political heir. That the notorious triumuira-
tus rei publicae constituendae was closely modelled on Sulla’s dictatura 
legibus scribundis et rei publicae constituendae hardly needs further ex-
planation. In terms of sweeping statutory empowerment and ruthless in-
strumentality, the triumvirate mimicked the extraordinary magistracy first 
created by Sulla Felix, albeit towards very different ends92. Until the depo-
sition of first M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 46, 42) and next Marcus Antonius 
(cos. 44, 34) in 36 and 32 successively, triumviral collegiality represented 
the main legal distinction93. However, that Caesar Octavianus as triumvir 
r.p.c. also closely imitated Sulla’s crafty return to normality94 has gone en-
tirely unnoticed. 
In B.C. 5.132, Appian recounts the following in a longer summation 
of measures taken by Imperator Caesar in the immediate aftermath of his 
hard-won victory over Sex. Pompeius and subsequent removal of Aemilius 
Lepidus in September 36 BCE: 
He allowed the annual magistrates to administer public affairs in 
many respects in accordance with ancestral custom.
Some five years before in 41 BCE, the consul L. Antonius had bravely 
clashed with Octavianus and — amongst other things — demanded 
«that the consuls should exercise their office in the ancestral manner 
and not be hindered by the triumvirs»: 
95. After the rapid collapse of the 
treaty of Teanum and the outbreak of hostilities in the so-called bellum 
Perusinum, Lucius thrice publicly proclaimed his (doomed) ambition 
to force the triumvirs to abdicate and so restore the ancestral polity 
92. Although their magistracy and powers were closely modelled on Sulla’s spe-
cial dictatorship, the triumvirs for the constitution of the Republic publicly professed to 
distance themselves from the latter in regard to the treatment of their enemies: see esp. 
App. B.C. 4.10. The reality, however, was that whereas Sulla proscribed 40 senators and 
1600 equites (App. B.C. 1.95 — after having executed some 8,000 mostly Samnite prisoners 
of war in the wake of the battle at the Colline Gate: App. B.C. 1.93), the triumvirs’ initial 
proscription list numbered about 300 senators and about 2,000 equites (App. B.C. 4.5). 
On this issue and how the triumviral proscriptions compounded the trauma of the Sullan 
precedent, see ECKERT, 2016, 170-172. 
93. On the deposition/abrogation of Lepidus and Marcus Antonius, see VERVAET, 2010, 
105 (with n. 78) and 127. 
94. Official reinstatement of consular collegiate rule in 81; second consulate with 
Metellus Pius in 80; and abdication of the dictatorship at the outset of 79.
95. App. B.C. 5.20.
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and consular rule96. Octavianus’ decision following Naulochus to allow 
the annual magistrates to resume many of their traditional prerogatives 
partially met L. Antonius’ demands and echoes Sulla’s ‘return to normalcy’ 
edict of mid-8197. 
It was, however, especially as triumvir (by default) sine conlegis from 
August 30 (or early in 32, after the formal abrogation of Antonius’ im-
perium) that he consciously emulated Sulla’s gradual retirement strate-
gy98. From January 31 until his formal abdication of the triumvirate on 13 
January 27, Young Caesar continuously combined the consulship with this 
plenipotentiary extraordinary magistracy. After the expiry of the second 
triumviral quinquennium on the last day of December 32, he, too, con-
sciously styled himself, and wanted to be represented only as, Imperator 
Caesar Divi filius and consul rather than as triumvir. In contrast to Sulla, 
however, he did so to avoid the embarrassment of continuatio as sole tri-
umvir, a position rendered increasingly awkward following the demise of 
Antonius and the conquest of Cleopatra’s Egypt. Thereafter, consulem se 
ferens99, he likewise masterminded a phased return to normality and (tem-
porary) consular supremacy, a carefully orchestrated process culminat-
ing in the dramatic and momentous settlements of 13 and 16 January 27. 
Some of the most striking aspects of this artfully devised road towards his 
decidedly autocratic version of Res Publica Restituta were his decisions to 
reinstate the consular (turnus of) fasces and the consuls’ role as leading 
96. First haranguing a contio in Rome as consul (App. B.C. 5.30) and subsequently in 
January 41 as proconsul at Perusinum, addressing his soldiers and then in his capitulation 
speech to Caesar Octavianus himself (App. B.C. 5.39 & 43; comp also 54). For a full 
discussion of these events and Lucius’ actions, see VERVAET, 2010, 92-96. RODDAZ, 1988 (esp. 
334-343) argues conclusively that Lucius’ policy in 41/40 «ne constitue pas un épisode de 
la lutte entre les triumvirs, même si, à ses côtés, les initiatives de Fulvie et de Manius se 
situent dans cette perspective, mais bien un ultime sursaut pour rétablir la République» 
(quoted from p. 344).
97. For a brief summary of the potestates extraordinariae invested in the triumvirs 
r.pc. by virtue of the Titian Law, see VERVAET, 2010, 125f. (with n. 118) and 2014a, 239-252. 
For the autumn of 36 as an important turning point in the political strategy of Imperator 
Caesar Divi filius, see MILLAR, 2000 and VERVAET & DART, 2018. A fine example of how the 
consuls had regained some of their customary prerogatives can be found in Dio 50.2.3f., 
where he records the actions of Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and C. Sosius on 1 January 
32. Nonetheless, as shown in 50.2.5f., Octavianus’ edict of 36 did not terminate triumviral 
supremacy over the consuls.
98. This paragraph summarizes the main findings of my 2010 inquiry into the official 
position of Imperator Caesar Divi filius from 31 to 27 BCE; for a more recent contribution 
to this discussion, see now also DALLA ROSA, 2015. 
99. See Tac. Ann. 1.2 for this masterly manner of defining Octavianus/Augustus’ 
political strategy in the years following his victories in the civil wars of the 30s BCE. 
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magistrates of the Republic in January 28, matched by a triumviral edict 
declaring the restoration of the laws and civil rights of the Roman People 
— leges et iura Populi Romani restituit. Not surprisingly, Octavianus took 
these measures while he was holding what was already his sixth consu-
late, with his trusted enforcer M. Vipsanius Agrippa (cos. 37, 28 & 27) as 
his colleague. Unlike Sulla, he thus could blindly rely on a readily agree-
able and compliant fellow consul. The final coup de théâtre, then, was his 
pompous and grandiloquent abdication of the triumvirate on 13 January 
27, at long last officially proclaiming that he had completed its set task 
to safeguard and restore the Republic100. In sharp contrast to Sulla, how-
ever, he did so while holding his seventh — and fourth consecutive — 
consulship, and with no intention whatsoever of relinquishing autocratic 
power over Rome’s machinery of state and its sprawling Empire101.
Conversely, the events of 28 also enable us to make plausible con-
jectures as to some of the specifics of what transpired in 81. Since the 
consuls had to dismiss their lictors/fasces in the presence of a dictator102 
and Sulla decided to stay in Rome and Italy throughout his entire tenure as 
dictator, his ‘return to normalcy’ edict of mid-81 may well have ordained 
that the consuls could resume the monthly turnus of the fasces, notwith-
standing his ongoing presence in Rome as dictator103. By virtue of this 
100. For the fact that Augustus on his dying bed asked his most intimate friends 
whether he had acted his part on the stage of life well and, if all be right, raise a loud 
applause to the actor’s praise, see Suet. Aug. 99.1.
101. According to Dio 53.11.5, the Senate’s very first decree following Octavianus’ 
theatrical abdication of the triumvirate on 13 January 27 showed the falsity of his desire to 
lay down the monarchy since he was voted a bodyguard with twice the regular pay. Just 
like his adoptive father, he seems to have embraced the rather self-serving belief that the 
traditional Republic was dead.
102. Livy 22.11.5 & Plut. Fab. 4.3 both record that in 217, after lake Trasimene, the 
dictator Q. Fabius Maximus ordered the consul Cn. Servilius Geminus to dismiss his lictors 
and lay aside the insignia of his office, and appear before him as if he were a private per-
son. Although the dismissal of a magistrate’s lictors normally symbolized his discharge, it is 
beyond all doubt that Cn. Servilius stayed in office for the remainder of 217 (BROUGHTON, 
MRR 1, 242 — see Livy 22.9.10 for the fact that M. Atilius Regulus was elected consul 
in place of C. Flaminius). Therefore, it is better to assume that the consuls were sim-
ply obliged to dismiss their lictors temporarily when being in the presence of a dicta-
tor. Evidently, this was powerful official acknowledgement of the institutional reality that 
whenever one or both consul(s) and a dictator were present in Rome or were campaign-
ing jointly, the summum imperium auspiciumque automatically devolved upon the dicta-
tor by virtue of his maius imperium and his special status as sole supreme commander. 
103. Since Sulla took overall control of all state affairs late in 82 BCE by virtue of the 
lex Valeria (cf. e.g. Rosc. Am. 22 supra), it is quite possible that this law explicitly con-
firmed that, for the duration of Sulla’s dictatorship, the consuls were permanently deprived 
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notable measure, the consuls of 81 would have officially resumed their 
customary role of principal magistrates, albeit under Sulla’s ongoing and 
watchful supervision. This visible reinstatement of consular prerogative 
would have made for a conspicuous display of Sulla’s commitment to the 
normalization of political life, offering strong encouragement for the rest 
of Roman officialdom also to resume their traditional responsibilities and 
play their part in Sulla’s exit strategy104. The ensuing year, insistent on 
governing the Republic as consul II with Metellus Pius, he probably con-
sistently appeared only with his twelve consular lictors105. Perhaps as early 
as on the first of January 79, for the last time he entered the Forum in the 
company of his twenty-four dictatorial lictors, complete with rods and 
axes, in order to give full pomp and circumstance to his long anticipated 
abdication. At all events, little could Sulla know that, some five troubled 
decades down the road, his example and method would be closely mim-
icked by the equally ruthless adoptive son of that Caesar he so detested 
and who barely escaped his wrath as a young man106.
of their lictors/fasces as long as they did not assume a provincial command. Unfortunately, 
it is impossible to elucidate this matter. On the (significance of the) turnus of the fasces, 
see VERVAET, 2014a, 30-53. 
104. In light of these considerations, it is quite likely that Sulla in 80 presided over 
the comitia consularia (see App. BC 1.103, supra) in his capacity of consul rather than as 
dictator. SYME, 2016a, 61 observes that both consuls of 79 «were close to the core of the 
oligarchy. Servilius’ mother was a Metella, and Ap. Pulcher had taken to wife her niece 
Caecilia, the daughter of Baliaricus» and speculates that they were the only candidates al-
lowed to present themselves for the election (comp. also p. 75). Mutatis mutandis and re-
gardless of considerable variance in regard to the approximate date of Sulla’s abdication of 
the dictatorship, this analysis does confirm Badian’s (esp. 1970, 13f.) hypothesis that «Sulla 
divested himself of power by stages» (if, however, according to him first of the dictatorship 
on 1 January 80, then of his second consulship on 29 December 80, and finally of his pro-
consulship of Gallia Cisalpina).
105. Contra BADIAN, 1970, 13, who believes that Sulla’s apprehension of Metellus as 
attested in Plut. Sull. 6.5f. (quoted supra) «can hardly mean that Sulla, during their joint 
consulship (or any significant part of it), had dictatorial imperium with twenty-four lictors 
and Metellus only consular with twelve». In any state affairs administered as consul II, Sulla 
would only ever have employed his twelve consular lictors, duly alternating the fasces 
with Metellus on a monthly basis. After December 81, he probably only appeared again 
in public in Rome with his twenty-four dictatorial lictors on the day of his abdication. 
Furthermore, Badian’s suggestion in 1970, 11 that Sulla «inconspicuously» dismissed 
twelve lictors when becoming consul on the Kalends of January 80 is incorrect in that the 
combination of dictatorship and consulship entailed that Sulla would have had one set 
of twenty-four lictors (with fasces and, in his case, axes) in his capacity of dictator, and a 
different one of twelve lictors (with only fasces) in his capacity of consul. 
106. That young Iulius Caesar barely escaped the wrath of Sulla is recorded in Suet. 
Diu. Iul. 1 and Plut. Caes. 1. 
74 FREDERIK J. VERVAET
THE DATE, MODALITIES AND LEGACY OF SULLA’S ABDICATION OF HIS DICTATORSHIP:  
A STUDY IN SULLAN STATECRAFT
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / CC BY-NC-ND Stud. hist., H.ª antig., 36, 2018, pp. 31-82
5. POSTSCRIPT: WHEN AND WHY DID SULLA ORDER THE KILLING OF Q. LUCRETIUS 
OFELLA?
A number of sources (esp. Livy, Per. 89, Plut. Sull. 33.4 & comp. Lys. 
et Sull. 2.4; App. B.C. 1.101) recount how Sulla notoriously had one of his 
foremost partisans107, Q. Lucretius Ofella, killed in the middle of the Forum 
because he had the temerity to run for the consulship against the dicta-
tor’s explicit advice. Ofella’s public execution was all the more notable as 
he had delivered the final victory in Italy for Sulla by capturing Praeneste, 
the ultimate holdout of the consul C. Marius the Younger, and was accom-
panied by a large and eager following when he was slain. According to 
Livy (Per. 89), Plutarch (Sull. 33.4) and Appian (B.C. 1.101), Sulla further-
more intentionally staged the ruthless public repression of his associate’s 
bid for the consulship on the strength of his capture of Praeneste. After 
sending out the centurion L. Bellienus108 with the order to kill Ofella, he 
took seat on a tribunal in the Temple of Castor and observed the spectacle 
from above109. When the horrified and enraged people seized the centu-
rion and brought him before the tribunal, Sulla promptly called a contio 
and proclaimed that he had himself ordered Lucretius’ execution because 
of his insubordination, and commanded them to release the centurion. 
He proceeded to tell the assembled crowd an ominous parable about a 
husbandman ridding himself from tenacious fleas by burning his shirt and 
bluntly threatened a third wave of mass violence110. These actions did not 
miss their intended effect, and Sulla was now able to rule «as he pleased» 
( : App., loc. cit.). 
Although both Plutarch and Appian seemingly situate this incident 
before Sulla’s grand triumph of 27 and 28 January 81111, Appian (B.C. 
107. See CHRIST, 20032, 105 & 108 for Ofella’s ranking status amongst the prominent 
men who came over to Sulla after he invaded Italy.
108. The name of the centurion is attested in Asconius Tog. Candid. 81 (p. 91 ed. 
Clark 1907), where we are also told that he was Catilina’s maternal uncle according to 
Cicero.
109. According to CLARIDGE, 2010, 94, the podium of the Temple of Castor was almost 
7 m high.
110. The story is on record in App. B.C. 1.101: «A farmer was bitten by fleas while 
ploughing. He stopped his ploughing twice in order to shake them out of his shirt. When 
they bit him again he burned his shirt, to avoid interruption in his work. And I tell you, 
who have felt my hand twice [i.e., in 88 and 83/82], to take warning lest the third time you 
need fire». It is hard not to construe the story of the farmer and the fleas as a thinly veiled 
insult of Pompeius, who had twice defied Sulla in 81, and Lucretius Ofella, who paid the 
hightest price for his insubordation. 
111. Degrassi Inscr. Ital. 13.1, 84f.
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1.101) also provides the key detail that Ofella had declared his candidacy 
for the consulship «while still in the equestrian order and before he had 
been quaestor and praetor, counting on the greatness of his services»:
. In other words, Sulla had Ofella executed because he ran 
in defiance of the lex Cornelia de magistratibus. Since we know from 
both Cicero (Rosc. Am. 139) and Appian (B.C. 1.100) that Sulla carried his 
laws after the election of the consuls of 81 (in fact, Appian, loc. cit., lists 
this Cornelian Law first in his summary of Sullan legislation), it follows 
that Ofella was most likely killed while running for one of the consul-
ships of 80, viz. at some time in the late spring or summer of 81112. In this 
respect, it is worth noting that Livy’s epitomator in Per. 89 also situates 
Sulla’s dictatorial legislation before his summary of Ofella’s public execu-
tion. Since Sulla himself was elected consul prior in 81, Ofella possibly 
had the intention to serve as his master’s colleague, in the conviction 
that such was his due reward for his feats at Praeneste. This, then, sug-
gests that Sulla may well have had ulterior motives for making a dreadful 
example of Ofella. First, the brutal public execution of an overly ambi-
tious eques from within his own faction may have served the purpose of 
restoring his authority and public image after the brash insubordination 
of another, even more prominent equestrian henchman of his: Cn. 
Pompeius Magnus. Early in 81, Pompeius had returned to Italy at the 
helm of his entire army in defiance of Sulla’s order for him to remain in 
Africa with only one legion. Ad urbem, Pompeius added insult to injury 
by leveraging his legions to demand the first equestrian curule triumph in 
Roman history. Faced with a stark choice, Sulla eventually dropped his 
strenuous opposition to this striking breach of triumphal customary law. 
Consequently, Pompeius went on to celebrate his unprecedented triumph 
on 12 March while Sulla no doubt suffered significant loss of face113. In 
112. Not, as some (e.g. SYME, 2016a, 58 and ECKERT, 2016, 151) believe, in 82. MÜNZER, 
1927, 1686; KEAVENEY, 2005 & CHRIST, 20032, 126f. all situate Ofella’s bid for the consul-
ship in 81. Rather than being completely misguided, the tradition in Firm. Mat. Math. 1.3 
that Sulla Lucretium iam priuatus occidit perhaps reflects that Sulla ordered the killing of 
Lucretius Ofella after he had called an end to the state of emergency and invited the magi-
strates of 81 (as well as the other public bodies) to resume their traditional duties. 
113. See VERVAET, 2014b, 132-136; cf. also Cic. Man. 61: uictorem exercitum deportauit. 
In Pomp. 14.6, Plutarch records that Pompeius’ historic equestrian triumph greatly boosted 
his popularity with the commons, as they were «delighted to have him still classed among 
the equites after a triumph». That Sulla never forgave Pompeius can be inferred from 
the fact that he omitted any mention of him in his will: Plut. Pomp. 15.2f. Pompeius’s 
successive marriages with Aemilia (Sulla’s stepdaughter) and next Mucia, the daughter of 
Q. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 95) and half-sister of Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (cos. 60) and Q. 
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fact, that Sulla chose the platform of the Aedes Castoris as his vantage 
point may well suggest that the crushing of Ofella was also meant as a 
deliberate warning to Pompeius and all other ranking equestrians114. Apart 
from the fact that the temple often served for meetings of the Senate115, 
the Dioscuri were first and foremost associated with the equestrians: 
Castor was favoured especially by the equites, and every 15 July, the tran-
suectio equitum, which began outside the City at a temple of Mars, would 
proceed through the Forum passing in front of the Temple of Castor and 
Pollux before ending on the Capitol116. Sulla’s entire strategy of gradual 
political normalization was hinged on the consolidation of peace in Rome 
and Italy as well as the enduring primacy of his legislation. Therefore, 
his dramatically orchestrated destruction of Ofella was probably also in-
tended as a powerful public statement that he would tolerate no further 
disturbances and irregularities for the remainder of his dictatorship, and, 
a fortiori, his second consulship117. That Sulla himself had to be excused 
Caecilius Metellus Nepos (cos. 57), may help to explain how he got away with this bold 
challenge of Sulla’s authority. 
114. Precisely forty years before, in 121 BCE, the consul L. Opimius had already 
stationed himself in the temple of Castor and Pollux when he took action to crush Gaius 
Gracchus and his associates (App. B.C. 1.25f.), «and it was probably there that the bleeding 
heads of the leaders were brought him, and there that he rewarded the slayers with the 
weight of the heads in gold»: FRAZER, 1929, 266. C. Gracchus’ attempts to elevate the power 
and position of the equestrians in the Roman polity are well known and beyond the scope 
of this inquiry. 
115. See FRAZER, 1929, 266 n. 2 for a list of literary and epigraphical sources 
documenting the Temple of Castor and Pollux as a venue for meetings of the Senate. 
116. See Dion. Hal. 6.13.4, Pliny H.N. 15.19; Aur. Vict. de Vir. Ill. 33 (who has the 
procession start at the Temple of Honos). As CLARIDGE, 2010, 95 explains, «as many as 5,000 
young men took part, carrying spears and shields and wearing olive wreaths and purple 
robes with scarlet bands, led by two youths on white horses, representing Castor and 
Pollux». In this respect, it is worth calling to mind that Sulla, when learning of Pompeius’ 
insubordination early in 81, reportedly told his friends it was evidently his fate to have his 
contests with boys: Plut. Pomp. 13.3. Compare also App. B.C. 1.96, where we are told that 
Sulla, after exposing Young Marius’ head in the Forum in front of the Rostra, indulged in a 
jest at the youth of the consul, saying «first learn to row, before you try to steer».
117. That Sulla perceived Ofella’s insubordination as threatening the very political 
order he had sought to (re)create is on record in Asconius Tog. Candid. 81 (p. 91 ed. 
Clark 1907): Hic [i.e., the centurion L. Bellienus] autem Lucretium Ofellam consulatum 
contra uoluntatem Sullae ad turbandum statum ciuitatis petentem occiderat iussu Sullae 
tunc dictatoris. Both Asconius (loc. cit.) and Dio 37.10.2 recount that Iulius Caesar (cos. 
59) in 64 BCE was instrumental in securing Bellienus’ conviction on account his killing 
of Ofella in the quaestio inter sicarios. Though indirectly aimed at Sulla and the legality 
of his proscriptions (see ECKERT, 2016, 156), Caesar’s involvement in the prosecution of 
Bellienus might suggest that Ofella ran on a reformist political platform in 81 BCE. At all 
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from the very law he invoked as grounds for Ofella’s summary execution 
accounts for yet another paradoxical irony of his dictatorship. Second, 
given the enormous importance he attached to his second consulship, 
Sulla must have felt it preferable to govern with a paragon of the senato-
rial nobility, Q. Metellus Pius. Apart from being a mere equestrian at the 
time of his candidature, Ofella had been at the very forefront of the grue-
some final stages of the civil war of 83/82118. At all events, the occurrence 
of a most serious incident during the run-up to the comitia consularia for 
80 would have strengthened Sulla’s resolve to continue his dictatorship 
throughout his second consulship.
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